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JURISDICTION
By Order dated January 15, 1988, the Supreme Court of Utah
transferred this consolidated appeal to this Court, pursuant to
§ 78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
This consolidated appeal is from a Judgment entered on
September 11, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court for
Salt Lake County, by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District
Judge.

The judgment of no cause of action was in favor of

defendant/respondent Forever Living Products, Inc., and against
plaintiff/appellant Ronald K. Neilson d/b/a Marina Mechanics
Enterprises and plaintiff-intervenor/appellant Astro Steel
Corporation.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

£

Nature of the Case.
This action was commenced by Ronald K. Neilson d/b/a Marina
Mechanics (hereinafter "Neilson" or "Marina Mechanics"), a
subcontractor on a marina construction project located in the
Lake Mead National Recreation Area.

The action was brought

against the owner of the marina, Forever Living Products, Inc.
(hereinafter "FLP") for amounts Marina Mechanics claimed it was
owed for construction of the marina.

Marina Mechanics'

asserted six theories of recovery against FLP:

(1) that FLP

had been unjustly enriched by Marina Mechanics; (2) that Marina
Mechanics was a third-party beneficiary under the terms of a
lease entered into between FLP and the United States Department
of the Interior; (3) that Marina Mechanics was a third-party
beneficiary of a general construction contract entered into
between FLP and Marinas Internationale, the general contractor
for the marina construction; (4) that FLP made an oral promise
to pay Marina Mechanics two hundred forty-nine thousand dollars
nine hundred and ninety-four dollars and fifty-seven cents
($249,994.57) allegedly owed Marina Mechanics by Marinas
Internationale when Marinas Internationale filed for bankruptcy; (5) that FLP was negligent in the manner in which it
administered the general contract by not paying Marinas
Internationale and its subcontractors with joint checks and by
-1-

not requiring Marinas Internationale to post a bond to protect
the subcontractors; (6) that FLP tortiously interfered with the
contract between Marina Mechanics and Marinas Internationale.
Thereafter, plaintiff in intervention, Astro Steel
Corporation (hereinafter "Astro" or "Astro Steel"), a material
supplier, was allowed to file a Complaint in Intervention which
basically restated the allegations of Marina Mechanics'
Complaint.
FLP's answers to the Complaint and the Complaint in
Intervention denied that either Marina Mechanics or Astro Steel
were entitled to any relief and raised various pertinent
affirmative defenses.
Course of Proceedings Below.
This matter was tried to the court, the Honorable Timothy
R. Hanson, District Judge, presiding, on June 9-11, 16 and
July 1, 1987. On June 16, 1987, after Marina Mechanics and
Astro Steel rested, FLP moved for a dismissal of the action,
pursuant to Rule 41(b) Utah R. Civ. P.

Although the court made

its ruling on that motion on June 16, 1987, (R. 000647, pp.
3-11), the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re:
Defendants Motion for Involuntary Dismissal was not signed
until October 9, 1987 (R. 000628-632) because it was misplaced
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by the clerk.

Pursuant to the Rule 41(b) motion the court

dismissed both Marina Mechanics' and Astro Steel's claims for
interference with contractual relations, negligence and those
based upon alleged oral promises or agreements.

The court then

took evidence and heard testimony from FLP regarding the unjust
enrichment and the third-party beneficiary claims.

On July 1,

1987 the court granted judgment in favor of FLP and against
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel on those remaining claims.
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which relate
only to the unjust enrichment and third-party beneficiary
claims, were signed by the court on September 11, 1987.
(Copies of both sets of findings of fact and conclusions of law
are attached hereto as Addenda 1 and 2.)

On that same day a

Judgment in favor of FLP and against Marina Mechanics and Astro
Steel was signed by the court.

(R. 00617).

(Copies of the

transcripts of the court's rulings of June 16, 1987 and July 1,
1987 are attached hereto as Addenda 3 and 4, respectively.)

On

October 6, 1987, the court signed an order granting Marina
Mechanics a 30 day extension in which to file a notice of
appeal in this matter (R. 000625).
Steel filed a notice of appeal.

On October 9, 1987, Astro

(R. 000633).

On November 9,

1987, Marina Mechanics filed a Notice of Appeal.
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(R. 000638).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 29, 1982, FLP entered into a Concessionaire's
Lease with the United States of America, Department of the
Interior, to act as a concessionaire on United States
Government property.

(R. 000607; see Addendum 2.)

The purpose

of this lease was to allow FLP to operate a marina located on
Callville Bay in the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, within
the State of Nevada.

Shortly thereafter, FLP began to operate

the marina that existed on Callville Bay.
Although FLP, which is an Arizona corporation, is in the
primary business of selling health related products made from
the Aloe Vera plant, it also has a resorts division which owns
resort properties such as marinas and hotels located in various
places around the country.

(R. 000662, pp. 122-123.)

In July of 1984, a storm occurred on Callville Bay which
damaged much of the existing marina and required extensive
repairs and reconstruction.

After the storm, FLP contracted

with a Mr. Dick Reed and his company, Store Afloat, to perform
the clean up of the debris.

FLP was also in the process of

working out a deal with Mr. Reed to have him perform the marina
reconstruction when he was killed in a helicopter crash.

(R.

000662, p. 126.)
Following Mr. Reed's death, FLP solicited and received bids
from several other contractors for the marina reconstruction.
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After conducting an investigation of the various contractors,
FLP ultimately determined to hire Marina^ Internationale, of
Herndon, Virginia, as the general contractor.

Prior to making

this determination, representatives of FLP met with the owners
of, and visually inspected, several other marinas constructed
by Marinas Internationale.

They found the other owners to be

very complimentary of Marinas Internationale's work.

FLP's

representatives were also impressed by the fact that some of
Marinas Internationale's marinas had survived hurricanes.

(R.

000662, pp. 128-131.)
Thereafter, on December 14, 1984, FLp entered into a
general construction contract (Trial Exhibit D-40, copy
attached hereto as Addendum 5) with Marinas Internationale for
the construction of the new marina on Callville Bay.

The base

price for the construction of the marina, per the general
contract, was $2,084,760.

The general contract also contained

a mechanism whereby Marinas Internationale was to be paid an
additional amount for anchoring the dock system, based upon
actual costs but not to exceed $101,740.

(Trial Exhibit D-40,

p. 7; see Addendum 5.)
The general contract was basically a "turnkey" project, in
other words, Marinas Internationale was to perform the total
construction of the marina and turn the project over to FLP
when the marina was ready for occupancy.
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(R. 000662, p. 131.)

The marina which was to be constructed by Marinas
Internationale was an extensive boat docking system which
included a main walkway running from the shore to the boat
slips, or berths, six piers of which three were to be covered
with a steel roof structure and a breakwater system to
neutralize the waves coming off of the lake into Callville
Bay.

Overall the marina was to have approximately 320 new boat

slips.

The docking system was to be anchored by an underwater

system composed of concrete blocks suspended on cables attached
to the dock.

(R. 000660, pp. 69-72.)

In constructing the marina, the components were to be
assembled on the shore and then floated out into the bay where
they were connected and then stabilized with the anchoring
system.

(R. 000660, pp. 66-67, R. 000662, p. 135.)

Of the total general contract amount, approximately 90% was
for materials to be shipped to the construction site and 10%
was for the actual labor in assembling the parts and placing
them in the Bay.

(Trial Exhibit D-40, pp. 2-3; see Addendum 5.)

The general contract between FLP and Marinas Internationale
required FLP to pay $188,979.50 as a deposit upon execution of
the contract, $1,700,850.50 as materials were delivered to the
job site, $174,555.00 as labor was performed in constructing
the marina, and $19,410.00 upon final completion.
D-40, pp. 2-3; see Addendum 5.)

(Exhibit

According to the general
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contract, the marina was to be completed no later than June 12,
1985.

(R. 000608; see Addendum 2.)

On March 1, 1985, Marinas Internationale entered into a
subcontract with Ronald K. Neilson, an individual from the
State of Utah.

Mr. Nielson did business as Marina Mechanics

Enterprises, a sole proprietorship.

Under this subcontract

Mr. Neilson, Marina Mechanics, was to perform certain services
relative to the construction of the marijia.

(R. 000608,629;

see Addenda 1 and 2.)
The contract between Marinas Internationale and Marina
Mechanics, entitled "Installation Contract" (Trial Exhibit P-3,
copy attached hereto as Addendum 6), required Marinas
Internationale to pay Marina Mechanics $]L50,696 for the installation of the dock, based on a price of $1.75 per square foot
for 86,112 square feet of dock.

The Installation Contract

further required Marina Mechanics' work -j:o be completed by May
31, 1985, incorporated by reference the provisions of the
contract between FLP and Marinas Internationale, and required
Marina Mechanics to be bound by those provisions.
609; see Addenda 2, 6.)

(R. 000608-

The Installation Contract also

contained the following provision:

"Nothing in this article

shall create any obligation on the part of the owner to pay or
to see the payment of any sums to any subcontractor."
Exhibit P-3, p. 3; see Addendum 6.)
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(Trial

On March 28, 1985, a change order to the Installation
Contract between Marinas Internationale and Marina Mechanics
was issued requiring Marina Mechanics to fabricate and provide
certain anchor blocks on the marina at an additional cost to
Marinas Internationale of $41,211.

(R. 000609; see Addendum 2.)

On May 11, 1985, Marina Mechanics began to perform as
subcontractor on the marina construction project in assembling
and constructing the floating dock system.

(R. 000609; see

Addendum 2.)
While performing the subcontract work, Marina Mechanics
submitted various pay requests to Marinas Internationale (Trial
Exhibits P-12, 16, 20, 21, 24 and 25, collectively attached
hereto as Addendum 7).

These documents indicate Marina

Mechanics was claiming that the original contract amount,
between Marina Mechanics and Marinas Internationale, had
escalated from $150,696 to $672,701.59.

There was never any

written acknowledgement or agreement from Marinas
Internationale respecting these additions to the contract.

(R.

000659, pp. 17-18.)
During this same time frame Marina Mechanics ordered steel
from Astro Steel to be used in the roofing structure of the
marina.

Astro Steel then ordered the steel from B & C Steel

Company from Nebraska and had several loads shipped to the
construction site.

(R. 000659, p. 139).
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Beginning with the original down payment in December, 1984,
and continuing through February, March, April, May and up to
June 10, 1985, FLP paid a total of $2,109/168.50 to Marinas
Internationale for materials and labor involved in the construction of the marina.

(R. 000609; see Addendum 2.)

When FLP

made the last payment on its contract with Marinas
Internationale, on June 10, 1985, Marina^ Internationale had
informed FLP that all material had been delivered to the
construction site and threatened to stop the job if final
payment was not made.

(R. 000662, pp. 133-136.) Additionally,

at that time, FLP was concerned about getting the marina
completed and opened for the 1985 summer season.

(R. 000662,

pp. 134-136.)
Marinas Internationale made its requests tor payment to FLP
by phone, mail, and sometimes telecopied messages wherein it
was indicated materials had been shipped to the site and
payment was required.

(R. 000662, pp. 1^1-134.)

Although Marinas Internationale had not paid Marina
Mechanics all it had requested during April and May of 1985,
Ronald Neilson was not overly concerned because he had dealt
with Marinas Internationale on other projects and it had always
been prompt with payment.

(R. 000660, p. 74.)

One June 12, 1985, Ronald K. Neilson submitted Request for
Payment No. 5 (Trial Exhibit P-24; see A4dendum 7) which
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indicated Marinas Internationale owed Marina Mechanics
$103,332.13.

(R. 000660, p. 84.)

On June 13, 1985, Marinas Internationale, the general
contractor, filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code.
of this action.

FLP had no prior knowledge or warning

(R. 000609.)

On June 14 or 15, 1985, after being advised that Marinas
Internationale had filed its bankruptcy petition, Ronald K.
Neilson prepared Request for Payment No. 6 (Trial Exhibit P-25;
see Addendum 7), back-dated it to June 12, 1985, and increased
the amount due, from the $103,332.13 he had requested in
Request for Payment No. 5 a few days earlier, to $249,994.57.
(R. 000660, p. 86.)
Soon thereafter, Marina Mechanics refused to perform any
further work on the marina unless measures were taken to insure
payment.

Therefore, on June 21, 1985, Rex Maughn, the president

of FLP, visited the project and paid Marina Mechanics $20,000
to meet its payroll for the coming week.

Also, Mr. Maughn told

Ronald K. Neilson that an agreement to keep Marina Mechanics
working on the project would be made through his people at
Callville Bay.

(R. 000661, pp. 12,15-16 and R. 000609-610; see

Addendum 2.)
On July 4, 1985, the accommodation agreement between FLP
and Marina Mechanics, as discussed by Mr. Maughn and
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Mr. Neilson, was memorialized when Ronald K. Neilson submitted
a weekly estimated cost for labor and equipment to complete
Callville Bay Marina to representatives of FLP.

Richard Ham

signed that estimate for Callville Bay Resorts on behalf of
FLP.

(Trial Exhibit P-32, attached hereto as Addendum 8.)

From July 4, 1985, until August 26, 1985, Marina Mechanics
operated pursuant to this accommodation whereby Marina
Mechanics was paid by joint check, payable to Marina Mechanics
and Marinas Internationale, based upon time and material
invoices submitted.

(R. 000609-610; see Addendum 2 and

R. 000661, pp. 209-210.) Marina Mechanics was paid in full for
the invoices submitted.

(R. 000631; see Addendum 1.)

When Astro Steel learned of Marinas Internationale's
bankruptcy, it held up the last shipment I of steel which was
enroute to the construction site from B S C Steel Company in
Nebraska.

(R. 000662, p. 33.)

From June 21, 1985 to the date of thd storm FLP paid a
total of $52,132.70 in joint checks to Marinas Internationale/
Marina Mechanics.

(R. 000610; see Addendum 2.)

On July 9, 1985, another storm arose in the Callville Bay
area of Lake Mead damaging the marina, wt^ich was still under
construction.

(R. 000610; see Addendum 2.)

Soon after the storm of July 9, 1985, Ronald K. Neilson and
representatives of FLP met and discussed storm damage repair
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work.

Present at this meeting, according to Ronald K. Neilson,

were Richard Ham and Larry Rehan, employees of FLP, and William
Graham, an employee of Marinas Internationale.

Mr. Nielson

testified that Richard Ham promised him that FLP would pay
Marina Mechanics for the amounts Marinas Internationale owed
Marina Mechanics as of the time Marinas Internationale filed
its bankruptcy petition.

(R. 000661, pp. 53-54.)

This

testimony was directly refuted by the testimony of Mr. Graham.
(R. 000659, p. 104.)
Nearly all of the work performed by Marina Mechanics from
July 9, 1985, the date of the storm, until August 26, 1985 was
storm damage repair.

(R. 000661, pp. 59, 71.)

On August 26, 1985, Neilson was ordered to cease performing
construction work in Nevada by the State Industrial Insurance
System of Nevada for nonpayment of insurance premiums that had
accrued in April, May and June of 1985; FLP had directly paid
the insurance premiums for July and August pursuant to the
accommodation between FLP and Marina Mechanics.

(R. 000610;

see Addendum 2, R. 000661, pp. 210-211.)
After Marina Mechanics was ousted from the construction
project by the State of Nevada, the remaining marina construction and storm damage repair work was performed by FLP using
its own work forces.

(R. 000610; see Addendum 2.)

In order to

complete the marina, FLP had to pay B & C Steel Company $36,000
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for the final shipment of roofing steel, which had been held
by Astro Steel, and then pay Jessop Brothers Construction
$70,000 to install the roof.

(R. 000662, pp. 138-139.) FLP

ultimately paid more than $2,267,301.00 for the complete
marina, exclusive of amounts it paid Marina Mechanics for the
storm damage repair performed from July 9 to August 26, 1985.
(R. 000611; see Addendum 2, R. 000662, pp. 138-139.)
Even though Ron Neilson claims he had an agreement from
FLP, in July of 1985, to pay Marina Mechanics the $249,994.57
Marinas Internationale allegedly owed it when Marinas
Internationale filed its bankruptcy petition, he was still
billing Marinas Internationale for the $249,994.57 in August
and September of 1985.

(R. 000649, pp. 6, 9.)

In August of

1985, a meeting was held at Callville Bay where Astro Steel
claims Richard Ham promised that FLP would pay Astro Steel fo
the amounts it was still owed by Marina Mechanics/Marina
Internationale.

(R. 000659, pp. 154-155.) As noted infra,

this testimony was found by the trial court to be incredible.
On October 26, 1985, the Department of the Interior gave
approval to open approximately one-half d>f the boat slips at
the Callville Bay Marina.

On January 6, 1986, the Department

of the Interior acknowledged completion and gave its approval
to open the completed marina.

(R. 000610; see Addendum 2.)

Due to the late completion date, FLP suffered significant
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economic losses in the form of lost profits from slip rentals
and other sources.

(R. 000611; see Addendum 2.)

Factual Statements in Appellants' Briefs Not Supported by the
Record.
Both the brief of Marina Mechanics, and the brief of Astro
Steel, contain factual assertions which are not supported by
the record.
Brief of Marina Mechanics
Marina Mechanics asserts that the Installation Contract
between Marinas Internationale and Marina Mechanics required
Marinas Internationale to pay Marina Mechanics $150,696 for the
installation of the dock and $304,900 to install the roof on
the marina.

(Brief of Marina Mechanics, 1f (c), p. 2.)

Although the installation contract between Marinas
Internationale and Marina Mechanics required Marinas
Internationale to pay Marina Mechanics $150,696 for installation of the dock, Ron Neilson admitted on cross-examination
that Marina Mechanics had no written contract, agreement or
acknowledgment from Marinas Internationale acknowledging any
further amount due and owing to him other than the $150,696
plus the $41,211 change order.

(R. 000659, pp. 17-18.)

Marina Mechanics asserts that beginning in December of 1984
and continuing through February, March, April, May and to
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June 10, 1985, FLP paid a total of $1,109,168.50 to Marinas
Internationale for materials "they thought" had been delivered
to the site and for labor involved in th^ construction of the
project.

(Brief of Marina Mechanics, 1f ^e), p. 3.)

Marina

Mechanics cites Amended Finding of Fact, 1f 12 as support of
this assertion.

Amended Finding of Fact 1f 12 states that FLP

had paid a total of $1,109,168.50 to Marinas Internationale by
June 10, 1985, the date Marinas Internationale filed its
bankruptcy petition, for materials and labor involved in the
construction of the marina.

(R. 000609; see Addendum 2.)

The

words "they thought" appear to be added to imply FLP was
mistaken that nearly all materials had been delivered to the
site and most of the labor had been performed.

Ronald K.

Neilson testified, on direct examination, that when Marinas
Internationale filed its bankruptcy petition, all of the
material had arrived for construction of the project with the
exception of one load of steel roofing material.

(R. 000660,

p. 78.) Also, on cross-examination Mr. Neilson testified that
as of the time Marinas Internationale filed its bankruptcy
petition, 71% of the labor had been performed on the marina
construction.

(R. 000661, pp. 207-208.)

Marina Mechanics asserts that the contract between FLP and
Marinas Internationale and the Installatipn Contract between
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Marina Mechanics and FLP contemplated third-party beneficiaries.

(Brief of Marina Mechanics, 1f (m), p. 4.)

Marina

Mechanics cites Amended Finding of Fact, 1f 8, to support his
assertion.

There is no such finding in the Amended Findings of

Fact, 1f 8.

(R. 000608; see Addendum 2.)

In fact, the

Installation Contract was between Marinas Internationale and
Marina Mechanics; FLP was not a party to that agreement.
(Amended Finding of Fact, 1f 8, R. 000608).
Marina Mechanics asserts that the contract between FLP and
Marinas Internationale required FLP to meet a certain payment
schedule and to see that subcontractors were adequately
compensated (Brief of Marina Mechanics, p. 9), or that under
the terms of the contract, FLP had an obligation to monitor the
payments and the delivery of the materials to the site.

(Brief

of Marina Mechanics, p. 20.) There is no such duty or obligation set forth in the general contract.

As noted above, the

general contract sets forth a payment schedule which merely
indicates that $188,979.50 was due as an initial deposit, the
balance of the contract was due as materials were delivered to
the construction site and as labor was completed and $19,410
was due upon final completion.

Furthermore, paragraph 19.1 of

that contract specifically states that Marinas Internationale
was required to pay for all labor, materials, equipment, tools,
construction, equipment and machinery, water, heat, utilities,
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transportation and other facilities and Services necessary for
the proper execution and completion of tl>e work.

(See

Addendum 5.)
Marina Mechanics argues that when Marinas Internationale
filed its bankruptcy petition on June 13, 1985, FLP had already
breached the written agreement, (Brief of Marina Mechanics,
p. 9.) and that FLP's payments to Marinas Internationale were
"improper and in violation of the terms of the contractual
agreement."

(Brief of Marina Mechanics, p. 13). There is no

evidence to support this position nor were there any findings
of fact or conclusions of law on that point.
Marina Mechanics asserts that on June 10, 1985, when FLP
made the final payment on its contract with Marinas
Internationale the work was only 30 to 40% complete.
Marina Mechanics, p. 13.) This is incorrect.

(Brief of

Approximately

90% of the general contract amount was fqr materials to be
delivered and 10% was for labor.

As noted, Ronald K. Neilson

admitted that at the time FLP made the last payment to Marinas
Internationale, nearly all of the materials had been delivered
to the site and approximately 70% of the labor had been
performed.

In other words, only 3% of the total contract

remained to be completed.
Marina Mechanics asserts that on June 21, 1985 when the
accommodation was reached between Marina Mechanics and FLP, the
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accommodation included an oral agreement by FLP to pay for the
debt owed by Marinas Internationale to Marina Mechanics.
(Brief of Marina Mechanics, p. 15). This, also, is incorrect.
Ronald K. Neilson testified that the alleged oral promise or
agreement by FLP to pay Marina Mechanics for the unpaid debt
owed by Marinas Internationale took place sometime after the
storm of July 9, 1985.

(R. 000661, pp. 53-54.)

No one has

ever contended that FLP promised, on June 21, 1985, to pay
Marina Mechanics for the amounts Marinas Internationale owed
Marina Mechanics.
Marina Mechanics asserts that both experts who testified at
trial agreed that FLP's payments to MI prior to the completion
of the work were not proper.
p. 27.) That is not correct.

(Brief of Marina Mechanics,
Joseph R. Brandise, the expert

called by FLP, when asked about the propriety of an owner
paying out a full contract price to a general contractor prior
to the completion of the contract, stated, "[tlhat's the
owner's discretion.
his money."

He can do anything he wants to do.

It's

(R. 000661, p. 116.)

Marina Mechanics asserts that, at the conclusion of the
testimony presented, the court refused to allow further
testimony regarding issues of damages and ruled that the
recovery under negligence for economic loss was not
appropriate.

(Brief of Marina Mechanics, p. 27.)
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While it is

true the court ruled that under Nevada law recovery is not
allowed on a negligence theory for economic loss, (R. 000631),
the court never precluded appellants from adducing evidence
except on matters not pleaded.

And, the court did not hear and

rule upon FLP's Rule 41(b) Motion to Dismiss until after Marina
Mechanics and Astro Steel had rested.
Brief of Astro Steel
Astro Steel asserts that the contract between FLP and
Marinas Internationale and the contract between FLP and Marina
Mechanics both contemplate third-party beneficiaries.
of Astro Steel, p. 3.)

(Brief

Astro Steel cites the Amended Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law to support this assertion.
There is no finding of fact or conclusion of law which
indicates a contract between FLP and Marina Mechanics
contemplated third-party beneficiaries.
Astro Steel asserts that FLP paid th^ full contract amount
to Marinas Internationale when the contract was only 30%
completed.

(Brief of Astro Steel, p. 7.)

While it was later

determined that at the time Marinas Internationale filed for
bankruptcy, approximately 30% of the labor for constructing the
marina had been completed, the labor portion of the general
contract was only 10% of the total contract price. Additionally, as previously noted at that time it was being represented
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to FLP that 70% of the labor for construction had been
completed and all materials had been delivered to the site.
Astro Steel, like Marina Mechanics, argues that the trial
court did not allow Astro Steel to "present further evidence of
the negligent payment issue."

(Brief of Astro Steel, p. 8.)

The Rule 41(b) motion was not heard and ruled upon until after
Astro Steel had rested.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Does Nevada law allow recovery of purely economic

damages on a negligence theory?
2.

Was the trial court correct in dismissing appellants',

Marina Mechanics' and Astro Steel's, claims involving alleged
oral promises or agreements because the evidence was too vague
and indefinite to support a finding of an oral contract between
the parties?
3.

Was the trial court correct in ruling that even if any

oral promises or agreements were made by FLP, recovery on those
promises or agreements was barred by the applicable statute of
frauds (§ 111.220 Nev. Rev. Stat. (1986)) as promises to answer
for the debt of another?
4.

Was the trial court correct in ruling that because

Marina Mechanics' rights and obligations relative to FLP and
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the marina construction were covered by express, written agreements, and because the record contained insufficient evidence
for the court to determine the damages attributable to a claim
for unjust enrichment, Marina Mechanics was precluded from
recovery on an unjust enrichment theory?
5.

Was the trial court correct in ruling that because FLP

paid a substantial sum for completion of its marina it was not
unjustly enriched by either Marina Mechanics or Astro Steel?
6.

Was the trial court correct in dismissing Marina

Mechanics' and Astro Steel's claims as third-party beneficiaries because Marina Mechanics, by contract, and both Marina
Mechanics and Astro Steel, by law, assumed the rights and
obligations of Marinas Internationale and, therefore, became
subject to all defenses, damages and offsets available to FLP,
which precluded any recovery?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111.220 (1986):
Agreements not in writing:

When voic^L

In the following cases every agreement shall be
void, unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof expressing the consideration, be in
writing, and subscribed by the party charged therewith:
1.
Every agreement that, by the terms, is
not to be performed within 1 ye4r from the making
thereof.
2.
Every special promise to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriage of another.
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3.
Every promise or undertaking made upon
consideration of marriage, except mutual promises
to marry. (1861, p. 11; CL 1873, § 289; GS 1885,
§ 2630; CL 1900, § 2700; RL 1912, § 1075; CL 1929,
§ 1553.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel have not challenged
any of the trial court's findings of fact, this Court must
review the conclusions of law and, if correct, affirm the
judgment in favor of FLP and against Marina Mechanics and Astro
Steel.
The trial court was correct in ruling in favor of FLP on
the negligence claims because Nevada law, which applies to this
case, states that purely economic losses are not recoverable on
negligence claims, such as those in this case. Marina
Mechanics and Astro Steel urge this court to apply law from
other jurisdictions when Nevada law is unequivocable on this
point.
Marina Mechanics' and Astro Steel's claims involving oral
promises or agreements were properly dismissed because the
evidence was too vague and indefinite to support a finding of
an oral contract between the parties.

The evidence on this

point revealed that when the promise was allegedly made to
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Ronald K. Neilson, Willxcmi uLdndiu, an uiuui.d;sfc?u LuiLu party, who
was identified by Ronald Neilson as being present when the
promise was made, testified he never heard any such promise.
And, the trial court found the testimony of Milton S. Taylor,
president of Astro Steel, incredible regarding the promise he
allegedly heard, because he changed his story.

Additionally,

the trial court ruled that even if any si^ch promises were made,
recovery upon them was barred by the applicable statute of
frauds as being promises to answer for the debt of another.
The judgment in favor of FLP on the unjust enrichment
claims was correct because FLP paid more than it originally
agreed to under its contract with Marinas Internationale and,
therefore, its enrichment was not "unjust."

FLP paid more than

$2,267,000 for the marina when it was supposed to pay no more
than $2,185,500. Under Nevada law, when an owner pays substantially all of the amount due on a prime contract to the general
contractor, a subcontractor may not recover as against the
owner on an unjust enrichment claim.

Furthermore, Marina

Mechanics' rights and obligations relative to the marina
construction were governed by an express, written agreement
which precludes recovery in quasi-contract.
The judgment in favor of FLP on the tpird-party beneficiary
claims was correct because FLP fully performed its obligations
under its contract with Marinas Internationale, through which
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Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel make their claim; therefore,
there is nothing left for FLP to be compelled to do. Also,
Marinas Internationale breached its contract with FLP which
releases FLP from any obligation for further performance.

And,

by claiming the third party beneficiary status through the
Marinas Internationale/FLP general contract Marina Mechanics
and Astro Steel become subject to all defenses, damages and
offsets available to FLP and are thereby precluded from
recovery.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"To mount a successful attack on the trial court's findings
of fact, appellants must marshal all the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the court
below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings."
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1985); see also,
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co.,
84 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 38 (Utah 1988).

P.2d

,

Conclusions of law are

accorded no particular deference, but are reviewed for
correctness.

Id.

As noted previously, the district court entered two sets of
findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case.
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The

first related to defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal
and the second pursuant to the court's ruling at the conclusion
of the case.
Astro Steel does not take issue with any of the findings of
fact entered by the court because in its statement of facts it
cites the court's Amended Findings of Fact as setting forth the
"pertinent facts relative to this appeal."
Steel, p. 2.)

(Brief of Astro

There are no specific challenges made by Marina

Mechanics to any of the findings of fact entered by the court.
However, in its list of issues presented, Marina Mechanics
makes the following assertion:

"[hjowever, the record substan-

tiates that there is more than sufficient evidence to support
said claim (unjust enrichment) and the court erred in its
judgment on this issue."

(Brief of Marina Mechanics, 1f (a), p.

5.)
This appears to be a challenge to thd findings of fact
relative to the unjust enrichment claim.

However, in its

argument on that point Marina Mechanics makes the following
statement, "[i]n this case, the appellant does not challenge
the trial court's findings of fact as to the claim itself
because plaintiff asserts that the trial (court's findings
establish a claim for unjust enrichment."
Mechanics, p. 11.)

(Brief of Marina

Therefore, there are no challenges to any

of the trial court's findings of fact and this Court must
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review the trial court's conclusions of law and, if they are
correct, affirm the judgment in favor of FLP.
A comparison of Marina Mechanics' and Astro Steel's
statement of issues presented and the trial court's conclusions
of law indicates the following conclusions of law are being
challenged:
1.

The economic losses suffered by Neilson and/or Astro

are not recoverable and do not support a claim of negligence.
(Conclusion of Law No. 3, R. 000631; see Addendum 1.)
2.

Any oral promises made by FLP to Neilson are barred

pursuant to the applicable statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 111.220 (1986), as promises to answer for the debt of
another.
3.

(Conclusion of Law No. 4, R. 000631; see Addendum 1.)
The evidence adduced is too vague and indefinite to

support the finding of an oral contract between the parties to
this action.

(Conclusion of Law No. 5, R. 000631; see

Addendum 1.)
4.

Any rights and/or obligations which existed between

FLP and Neilson were covered by express, written agreements
which preclude any recovery by Neilson based upon a theory of
unjust enrichment.

(Conclusion of Law No. 4, R. 000612; see

Addendum 2.)
5.

The record contains insufficient evidence for the

court to determine damages attributable to a claim of unjust
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enrichment by Neilson.

(Conclusion of Law No. 5, R. 000612;

see Addendum 2.)
6.

FLP paid a substantial sum for completion of the

Callville Bay Marina and therefore has not been unjustly
enriched by either Neilson or Astro.

(Conclusion of Law No. 6,

R. 000612; see Addendum 2.)
7.

Under the terms of the Installation Contract, Neilson

agreed to assume all the obligations that Marinas Internationale
had to FLP.

The defenses and liquidated damages available to

FLP under the General Contract excuse FLP from any performance
or obligation to Neilson as a third-party beneficiary and
preclude any recovery by Neilson.

(Conclusion of Law No. 7, R.

000612; see Addendum 2.)
8.

Both Neilson and Astro, by claiming third-party

beneficiary status, assume the rights and obligations of
Marinas Internationale and subject themselves to all defenses
available to FLP under the terms of the General Contract.
Marinas Internationale is in material breach of the General
Contract entered into with FLP.
any further performance.

FLP is thereby excused from

Therefore, neither Neilson nor Astro

may recover as third party beneficiaries to the general
contract.
9.

(Conclusion of Law No. 8, R. 000612; see Addendum 2.)

The liquidated and other damaged available to FLP

under the general contract offset any third-party benefits
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claimed by Astro.

(Conclusion of Law No. 9, R. 000612; see

Addendum 2.)
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel do not challenge the
dismissal of their claims for tortious interference with
contractual relations.
Additionally, the trial court ruled that this case is
governed by Nevada law (R. 000647, pp. 4-5; see Addendum 3.)
Neither Marina Mechanics nor Astro Steel challenged the Court's
ruling on that point at trial, nor do they here.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT
NEVADA LAW DOES NOT ALLOW A CLAIM BASED UPON
A NEGLIGENCE THEORY WHERE ONLY ECONOMIC
DAMAGES ARE ALLEGED.
The only damages alleged by Marina Mechanics and Astro
Steel were for economic losses.

There were no allegations of

personal injury or property damage of any kind.

The Supreme

Court of Nevada has made it clear that, " . . . absent privity
of contract, or an injury to a person or property, a plaintiff
may not recover in negligence for economic loss."

Local Joint

Exec. Board of Las Vegas v. Stern, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (Nev.
1982), and cases cited therein.

In explaining this rule the

Supreme Court of Nevada stated:
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The primary purpose of the rule is to shield a
defendant from unlimited liability for all of the
economic consequences of a negligent act, particularly
in a commercial or professional setting, and thus to
keep the risk of liability reasonably calculable.
A small minority of jurisdiction^ do permit
recovery for a negligent interference with economic
expectancies under certain limited circumstances.
However, we believe the tests that have been developed
to determine who should recover for negligent interference with contract or prospective economic advantage
are presently inadequate to guide trial courts to
consistent, predictable, and fair results. The
foreseeability of economic loss, even when modified by
other factors, is a standard that sweeps too broadly
in a professional or commercial context, portending
liability that is socially harmful in its potential
scope and uncertainty. We therefore decline to adopt
the minority view allowing such recovery.

Id,
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel urge this Court to, in
I
effect, overrule the Nevada Supreme Court} and apply a rule of
law which was specifically rejected by that court.

The only

case from Nevada cited by Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel in
support of their position is Williams v. City of North Las
Vegas, 541 P.2d 652 (Nev. 1975).

That case was a wrongful

death action where the court held, ". . .an individual,
although unnamed in a contract or a stranger to both parties
thereto, may bring suit where a breach off the contract has
caused him injury."

Id. at 655.

(Emphasis added).

FLP does

not disagree with that proposition, but there is no injury to
person or property alleged here. Marina Mechanics and Astro
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Steel have submitted no authority, from Nevada, for the
position they are taking.
Astro Steel claims that it incurred damages which are not
purely economic, i.e., lost bonding capacity.

No matter what

they choose to call it, Astro Steel's claim is for economic
damages.

Lost bonding capacity is not an injury to a person or

physical property damage.
Additionally, even after Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel
presented all of their evidence on their negligence claims, the
trial court was not convinced, one way or the other, that a
breach of any duty had been shown.
Addendum 3.)

(R. 000647, pp. 4-5; see

Therefore, appellants did not meet their burden

of proof on a negligence claim, even if Nevada law recognized a
negligence claim for purely economic loss.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF ALL CLAIMS
INVOLVING ALLEGED ORAL PROMISES OR
AGREEMENTS WAS CORRECT.
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel allege that Richard Ham, a
representative of FLP, promised Ron Neilson that Marina
Mechanics would be compensated for amounts which were owed it
by Marinas Internationale when Marinas Internationale filed its
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bankruptcy petition.

Speciricany, Kon wenson testiried

Richard Ham told him that "out of the insurance proceeds that
were - would be collected, I would recover the loss - my shortfall on that project or my losses sustained on the project."
(R. 000661, p. 51.) He also testified, on cross-examination
that, "[w]hat I was promised was that I ^ould have my losses
recouped and made whole again.

I don't know the exact words

that were used and whether there was an exact figure put on
that or not, I don't recall."

(R. 000659, p. 16.) This

conversation allegedly took place immediately following the
storm of July 9, 1985.

Others present, as identified by Ronald

K. Neilson, were Richard Ham, Larry Rehan and William Graham.
(R. 000661, pp. 53-54.) Mr. Graham, who was an employee of
Marinas Internationale and, therefore, a disinterested bystander, at least as to the outcome of this lawsuit, testified
that he never heard Mr. Ham make any such promises.

(R. 00659,

p. 104.)
At trial, Milton Taylor, president of Astro Steel,
testified that Richard Ham made a similar promise to him on
August 8, 1985, at Callville Bay.

Specifically, he testified:

At first he (Richard Ham) said that they (FLP)
weren't responsible for the payment of that bill; that
it was Marinas Internationale and Marinas
Internationale having filed a bankruptcy, he didn't
know what was going to happen on that money. After a
little bit of discussion there was something brought
up about a licorice factory or something that Marinas
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Internationale was trying to sell and they were
holding up any payment contemplating getting some
money back from Marinas Internationale on that
licorice factory. And they said that we would be
getting our money when they got — they wanted to see
how much they could get back out of Marinas
Internationale first and then they would, you know,
use that money to pay us and make up whatever balance
we needed to get.
(R. 000659, pp. 154-155).
At his deposition Mr. Taylor testified that he never heard
Richard Ham make any such promises to anyone.

(Transcript of

Deposition of Milton S. Taylor, pp. 21-22, 37-40.)

The trial

court indicated it found Mr. Taylor's testimony incredible
because he changed his story.
Addendum 3.)

(R. 000647, pp. 8-9; see

The court dismissed the claims regarding the

alleged oral promises or agreements on two separate grounds.
First, the court found that the oral promises allegedly made by
FLP to Marina Mechanics were barred pursuant to the Nevada
statute of frauds (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111-220 (1986)) as
promises to answer for the debt of another.
Addendum 1.)

(R. 000631; see

Second, the court found the evidence adduced was

too vague and indefinite to support the finding of an oral
contract between the parties to the action.

The trial court's

ruling on this issue is instructive:
. . . the Supreme Court of various states, including
Utah, has said that you can't enforce an oral contract
unless it's definite enough so that you'll know that
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the terms of it are. In other words, a vague agreement that is so unspecific so as to be unenforceable
cannot be enforced in an oral agreement. And this
just gets back to the— it's just good business sense
to have writings, and people don't find themselves in
these positions.
But I can't enforce that contract. I don't know
what recoop his losses means, even if it occured. And
at this stage of the proceedings, that's all the
evidence there is. And I don't have to decide whether
it was really said or it wasn't said. But taking the
evidence the way it was, Mr. Neilsen, the only thing
he's been able to say, and I appreciate the parties'
candor in this case, but, is that Forever Living
Products quote, "promised to recoop his losses."
Promised to allow him to recoop his losses. And I
don't have — I couldn't enforce that, not in good
conscience, because I wouldn't know what number to put
on it.
I
And if I put the $240,000 figure on it that
Marinas Internationale was supposed to pay, then it's
answering for the debt of another, clearly. So I
can't enforce an oral contract that one in particular,
that is so vague and so indefinite that I don't know
it's terms, because I wouldn't know what to tell the
defendant to pay. It would just be sheer speculation.
And the same is true with the agreement in August.
I have trouble with Mr. Taylor's testimony,
because he did testify, at least in my judgment, in
different ways on different occasions. And perhaps
the reason he suggested, that he was tired, and it was
a long day is the reason for that. But that doesn't
explain, unfortunately, why that was not added to, or
why that clarity was not made when the deposition was
read.
But even if I take what was said on the witness
stand today, the same problem exists with regard to
the August meeting. It's so indefinite, and so vague
that I can't hold the defendant on an oral contract
for that claim that we're going to pay the balance due
after Marinas Internationale is now in bankruptcy and
sells some licorice factory. There is just nothing
there — nothing that rises to the level of what the
law is going to impose an obligation on a party who
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does not agree that there was an oral contract.
think the law is pretty clear on that.

And I

(R. 000647, pp. 7-9; see Addendum 3.)
Marina Mechanics argues that the statute of frauds does not
apply if there is part performance of the alleged oral agreement or detrimental reliance pursuant to the alleged oral
agreement.

Marina Mechanics states that representations by FLP

regarding the repayment or recouping of losses from MI induced
Neilson to remain upon a job to his detriment.

(Brief of

Marina Mechanics, p. 18). There is no evidence to support this
position.

The alleged representation took place on July 9, or

10th, 1985.

(R. 000659, pp. 5-6.)

This was after the accommo-

dation agreement (Trial Exhibit P-32; see Addendum 7) had
already been executed by Ron Neilson and FLP indicating Marina
Mechanics would be paid on a time and materials basis as
invoices were submitted.

Ron Neilson testified, and the trial

court found, that Marina Mechanics was paid in full by FLP for
all amounts invoiced, pursuant to the accommodation agreement.
(R. 000661, p. 209; R. 000631; see Addendum 1.)

Marina

Mechanics operated pursuant to that accommodation agreement
until August 26, 1985 when it was ousted from the project by
the State Industrial Insurance Fund of Nevada.

It is clear

that, even if Rich Ham promised Ron Neilson something, there
was no reliance upon or performance pursuant to such a
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promise.

Specifically, the trial court found, "[i]'m also

satisfied that to the extent a contract was created by the
estimate that was signed by I believe it was Mr. Ham on behalf
of Forever Living Products for the work that went on after
July, that Mr. Neilsen has received everything that he is
entitled to."

(R. 000647, p. 10; see Addendum 3.)

The part performance exception to the statute of frauds is
available only when an equitable remedy is sought.
v. Parley, 184 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1947).

See, Baugh

As was stated in

William Henry Brophy College v. Tovar, 619 P.2d 19 (Ariz. App.
1980), "[w]e believe the correct rule . . . to be that where a
party attempting to enforce an oral agreement seeks an
equitable remedy, such as specific performance, the equitable
doctrine of estoppel and part performance are available to
him.

Where he seeks only a legal remedy, such as money damages

for breach, they are not."

Ld. at 23 (citations omitted).

Because Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel seek damages, not
equitable relief, the partial performance exception does not
apply to this case.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT
FLP WAS NOT UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY MARINA
MECHANICS AND ASTRO STEEL BECAUSE FLP PAID
FULL VALUE FOR EVERYTHING IT RECEIVED.
It is well established that a subcontractor is precluded
from recovering against a property owner in quasi-contract
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where the owner has already paid its general contractor all, or
a substantial part of, the amount due under the terms of the
general contract.

To allow the subcontractor to recover from

the landowner under such circumstances requires the owner to
pay twice.

See, 62 ALR 3d 288 (1975), and authorities cited

therein.
The Supreme Court of Nevada has unequivocally adopted this
position.

In Zalk-Joseph's Co. v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 366 P.2d

339 (Nev. 1961), the court considered a materialman's claim
against a general contractor based on unjust enrichment.

The

court summarily rejected it, finding that the defendant had no
dealings with the plaintiff and had not in any way been
unjustly enriched by plaintiff's labor and services.

The

defendant, the court noted, had paid its subcontractor the
precise amount paid by the owner for the materials provided by
plaintiff to the subcontractor.

_Id. at 342.

In Bowyer v. Davidson, 584 P.2d 686 (Nev. 1978), the court
considered a subcontractor's unjust enrichment claim against an
owner.

In that case the owner had paid the general contractor

all but 2% of the contract price.

The court held that under

such circumstances recovery based on unjust enrichment was
unwarranted:
[Owner] paid the [general contractor] substantially
all of the amount due on the prime contract.
Moreover, appellant could have protected himself by
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the exercise of his lien rights against the property.
N.R.S. 108.222. Under these circumstances, the
enrichment, if any, resulting to the respondents from
appellant's labor and materials is not unjust.
Id. at 688, (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court found that FLP paid more than
$2,267,000 for completion of the marina.

The general contract

between FLP and Marinas Internationale provides that FLP was to
receive a complete marina for a price between $2,083,760 and
$2,185,500 depending on the dollar amount ultimately expended
for the marina anchoring system.

Neither Marina Mechanics nor

Astro Steel have presented any authority suggesting that an
owner can be unjustly enriched by materials or services for
which it has already paid.

Nevada law, as expressed in the

Zalk-Joseph's and Bowyer cases, is dispositive on this issue.
Marina Mechanics argues that, even though FLP paid full
price for its marina, it was unjustly enriched because its
payments to Marinas Internationale were improper and in
violation of the terms of the terms of the contractual
agreement.

(Brief of Marina Mechanics, p. 13). There is no

basis in law or the facts for that proposition.

As noted,

there was no duty or obligation in the FLP/Marinas
Internationale contract for FLP to see that monies paid to
Marinas Internationale went to subcontractors and materialmen.
Nor has it been established that FLP breached its agreement
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with Marinas Internationale.

Marina Mechanics has cited no

authority for its position even if FLP, somehow, breached its
contract with Marinas Internationale.

Therefore, the

unchallenged finding of fact that FLP paid over $2,267,000 for
a marina which was supposed to have been constructed for
hundred of thousands of dollars less, supports the conclusion
of law that FLP has not been unjustly enriched by either Marina
Mechanics or Astro Steel.
The trial court also ruled that Marina Mechanics could not
prevail on its unjust enrichment claim because it had an
express agreement which delineated its rights and liabilities.
It is well established that recovery based on unjust enrichment
is unavailable when the services or materials for which it is
sought are furnished pursuant to an express contract.

If this

were not the rule, written compensation agreements would be
meaningless.

O'Keeffe v. Bry, 456 F. Supp. 822, 831 (S.D.N.Y.

1978).
In effect, Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel are asking this
Court to rewrite the contracts to make FLP responsible for
payment directly to subcontractors and material men.

The

Supreme Court of Nevada in Lipshie v. Tracy Investment Co., 566
P.2d 819 (Nev. 1977), stated,

"[t]o permit recovery by quasi-

contract where a written agreement exists would constitute a
subversion of contractual principles."
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_Id. at 824.

The same

rule applies here; to require FLP to pay more for the marina
than it has already paid would require a reformation of the
written contracts involved in this case.

FLP submits that such

a reformation was not pleaded and is not supported in this case
by the facts or the law.

While it is unfortunate that Marina

Mechanics and Astro Steel may not have received full payment
for services and/or materials provided for the marina construction, the responsibility for any such nonpayment does not rest
with FLP.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING A
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF FLP ON THE THIRD-PARTY
BENEFICIARY CLAIMS.
The trial court granted judgment in IOVUL u£ FLP on the
third-party beneficiary claims on several grounds. First,
Marina Mechanics, in its contract with Marinas Internationale,
agreed to assume all the obligations that Marinas Internationale
owed to FLP; therefore, the defenses and liquidated damages
available to FLP preclude any recovery by Neilson.

Second, as

third-party beneficiary claimants, Marina Mechanics and Astro
Steel were subject to all defenses available to FLP under the
terms of the general contract; third, Marinas Internationale
was in material breach of the general contract and, therefore,
FLP was excused from any further performance, and fourth, the
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liquidated and other damages available to FLP under the general
contract offset any third-party benefits claimed by Marina
Mechanics and Astro Steel.

(R. 000613; see Addendum 2.)

The general rule is that, "[o]ne suing on a contract
allegedly made for his benefit as a third-party beneficiary
must accept the contract as it was made by the parties thereto;
and he is in no better position than, and his rights are not
greater than those of, the contracting party through whom he
claims,

..."

Stevens v. Great Southern Savings & Loan

Ass'n., 421 S.W.2d 332, 340 (Mo. 1967).
The Supreme Court of Nevada has, in several cases,
expressed its agreement with this general rule.

In Morelli v.

Morelli, 720 P.2d 704 (Nev. 1986), the court, citing Britton v
Groom, 373 P.2d 1012 (Okla. 1962), stated "[a] third-party
beneficiary who seeks to enforce a contract does so subject to
the defenses that would be valid as between the parties."

In

Gibbs v. Giles, 607 P.2d 118 (Nev. 1980), the court noted the
general rule that "a third-party beneficiary takes subject to
any defense arising from the contract that is assertible
against the promisee, . . . "

.Id. at 120. Thus, Marina

Mechanics' and Astro Steel's rights as third-party beneficiaries are no greater than those of Marinas Internationale,
the party through whom they claim the benefit.
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FLP fully

performed its obligations under the terms of the prime contract; no further performance by FLP is required.

Marinas

Internationale was paid everything it was owed under the
general contract.

However, Marinas Internationale failed to

complete the project and, therefore, breached the contract.

If

Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel elect to accept the contract
of Marinas Internationale, they become subject to the defenses,
damages and the penalty provision of paragraph 9 of the general
contract requiring payment of at least $104,000 in liquidated
damages for failure to meet the performance schedule.

The

general contract is an integrated and indivisible document.
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel seek to sever the contract,
choose the parts which are beneficial to them and discard the
rest.

To assert any rights under the contract, they must

accept the terms of the entire document.
It is axiomatic that a material breach of contract by one
party fully justifies a suspension of performance by the
other.

Lagrange Construction Co. v. Kent Corp., 429 P.2d 58,

59 (Nev. 1967); Cladianos v. Friedhoff, 240 P.3d 208 (Nev.
1952); Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 237 (1979).

Even if

there were something left for FLP to perform under its contract
with Marinas Internationale, such performance was rendered
unnecessary by Marinas Internationale's breach of the
contract.

As is expressed in the Restatement (Second) of

Contracts, § 309(2) (1979):
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If a contract ceases to be binding in whole or in part
because of the impracticability, public policy,
non-occurrence of a condition, or present or
prospective failure of performance, the right of any
beneficiary is to that extent discharged or modified.
(Emphasis added)
Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel cite Morelli v. Morelli,
supra, as support for the argument that they should obtain
further performance from FLP even though FLP has fully
performed its contract with Marinas Internationale and even
though Marinas Internationale breached that contract.

In that

case a husband and wife entered into a property settlement
agreement wherein the husband agreed to pay the cost of tuition
for their child at the college the parties agreed was most
appropriate.

A few years after the agreement was executed, the

wife died and appellant, the child, sued the father to force
him to pay her college tuition.

The husband contended that the

child, as a third-party beneficiary, stepped into the shoes of
the wife and since the wife did not agree on which school was
most appropriate for the child, as required by the agreement,
the child could not enforce the contract.

In ruling on the

issue, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that, although a thirdparty beneficiary who seeks to enforce a contract does so
subject to the defenses that would be valid as between the
parties, the wife's death made compliance with that provision
impossible and did not shift the responsibility to the child.
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Id. at 706. Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel argue that it was
impossible for them to perform Marinas Internationale's
obligations under the contract, therefore they should be able
to recover as against FLP.

It is not FLP's position that the

failure of a condition precedent absolves it of its obligations
under the general contract.

FLP's position is that it has

already performed its obligations and is excused from any
further performance because of Marinas Internationale's
material breach of the contract.

Additionally, the liquidated

damages and other damages available to FLP offset any possible
claim Marina Mechanics or Astro Steel might have.
CONCLUSION
Although it is unfortunate that Marina Mechanics and Astro
Steel did not receive all they feel they were owed for labor
and materials supplied to construct the Callville Bay Marina,
the responsibility for this problem does not rest with FLP.
The party which should bear the responsibility, Marinas
Internationale, has been shielded by the United States
Bankruptcy laws.

FLP has suffered as a result of Marinas

Internationale's actions, as well.

Instead of having a com-

plete marina in June of 1985 for the cost of $2,185,000, FLP
received a complete marina in January of 1986 at a cost of over
$2,267,000.
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The trial court was correct in its dismissal of and
judgment in favor of FLP upon the claims asserted by Marina
Mechanics and Astro Steel.

The trial court's findings of fact

are unchallenged by Marina Mechanics and Astro Steel and are
supported by the evidence.

The trial court's conclusions of

law are correct and the judgment in favor of FLP should be
affirmed.
DATED t h i s ffifii day of August, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
Geoi/ge A. Hunt
Ryai\/E. Tibbitts
Attorneys for Respondent
Forever Living Products, Inc.
SCMRET116
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ADDENDUM 1

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Defendant's Motion
for Involuntary Dismissal

- JFILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
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Salt Lake County Utah
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' OCT - 3 ».87
GEORGE A. HUNT (A1586)
RYAN E. TIBBITTS (A4423)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RONALD K. NEILSON, dba MARINA
MECHANICS ENTERPRISES, and
ASTRO STEEL CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation (Intervenor),
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF
CONCLUSIONS
DEFENDANT'S
INVOLUNTARY

FACT AND
OF LAW RE:
MOTION FOR
DISMISSAL

vs.
FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant.

Case JNO . U85-6367
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

This matter came on regularly before the court for a nonjury trial on June 9, 1987, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
District Judge, presiding; Edwin T. Peterson of Maddox &
Snuffer appearing for plaintiff, Ronald K. Neilson, dba Marina
Mechanics Enterprises, (hereinafter "Neilson"); J. Ray Barrios
of Mueller, Barrios & Christiansen, appearing for plaintiff
intervenor Astro Steel Corporation, (hereinafter "Astro"); and

George A. Hunt and Ryan E. Tibbitts of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau appearing for defendant Forever Living Products,
Inc., (hereinafter "FLP"); and the plaintiff and plaintiff
intervenor having adduced evidence by way of testimony and
documentary exhibits and having argued the matter to the court,
and the court having reviewed the file, exhibits and memoranda
submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the premises, and the defendant having moved for involuntary dismissal
of the claims of plaintiff and intervenor pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 41(b) and the court having considered arguments of
counsel, and good cause appearing, now, therefore, the court
hereby makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Ronald K. Neilson is an individual residing

in the State of Utah and doing business as Marina Mechanics,
Enterprises, a sole proprietorship with its principal place of
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Plaintiff Intervenor, Astro Steel Corporation, is a

Utah corporation in good standing with its principal place of
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

Defendant, Forever Living Products, Inc., is an

Arizona corporation registered to do business in the State of
Utah, and doing business in, among other locations, the State
of Nevada.

4.

The claims of Neilson and Astro arose in the State of

Nevada.
5.

On December 12, 1984, a General Construction Contract

was entered between FLP and Marinas Internationale which
created a direct economic relationship between them.
6.

None of the parties have adduced any evidence proving

that FLP intentionally interfered with the contractual
relations between Marinas Internationale and Neilson.
7.

All damages suffered by Neilson and Astro as shown by

the evidence adduced in this action are purely economic in
nature.
8.

No damage to persons or property has been proved.
The only evidence adduced by plaintiff to support a

claim for damages for breach of oral contract is that FLP
promised to "recoup Neilson's losses."

Such representations,

if made, constitute a promise by FLP to answer for a debt of
Marinas Internationale.
9.

|

No promise was made by FLP to Astro to pay the balance

due Astro by Marinas Internationale. I
10.

Neilson failed to pay the workman's compensation pre-

miums required by Nevada law long before Marinas Internationale
declared bankruptcy on June 13, 1985.

The failure to make

these required payments was the sole cause of Neilson being
forced to leave the Callville Bay Maritia construction site and
to cease construction work in the State of Nevada.
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11.

All the work performed by Neilson after July 9, 1985,

pursuant to the arrangement between the parties, was paid for
in full by FLP pursuant to invoices submitted by Neilson.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court draws the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The State of Nevada is the state with the most

significant relationship to the transactions here in question.
Therefore, Nevada law applies.
2.

FLP had a significant financial interest and its own

contractual relationship which justified any interference with
the Neilson-Marinas Internationale Installation Contract.
3.

The economic losses suffered by Neilson and/or Astro

are not recoverable and do not support a claim of negligence.
4.

Any oral promises made by FLP to Neilson are barred

pursuant to the applicable statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 111.220 (1986), as promises to answer for the debt of another.
5.

The evidence adduced is too vague and indefinite to

support the finding of an oral contract between the parties to
this action.
6.

Defendant's Motion for Involuntary Dismissal should be

granted against both plaintiff and intervener in accordance
herewith and an appropriate Judgment of Dismissal entered.
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1.-2.

DATED thi

day of

*imothy R. Hanson
d i s t r i c t Court Judge

ATTEST
«3=fc

By XJ2UW/?C\£
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ADDENDUM 2

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

ikz
!L^D \K CLEn.CS OFFJCC
S^-,1 is.\c CCJ.-IV liter:

GEORGE A. HUNT (A1586)
RYAN E. TIBBITTS (A4423)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
10 Exchange Place, Elevent
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE "OUNTY
STATE OF UTAH I
RONALD K. NEILSON, dba MARINA
MECHANICS ENTERPRISES, and
ASTRO STEEL CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation (Intervenor),

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.

FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendant.

Case No. C85-6367
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

This matter came on regularly before the court for a nonjury trial on June 9, 198r\ tne honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
Utah State District Judge, presiding; Edwin T

Peterson of

Maddox & Snuffer appearing for plaintiff, Ronald K. Neilson,
dba Marine Mechanics Enterprises, (hereinafter

Neilson"); J.

Ray Barrios of Mueller, Barrios & Christiansen, appearing for
plaintiff intervenor Astro Steel Corporation, (hereinafter
"Astro");

Christensen & Martineau appearing for defendant Forever Living
Products, Inc., (hereinafter "FLP"); and the parties having
adduced evidence by way of testimony and documentary exhibits
and having argued the matter to the court, and the court having
reviewed the file, exhibits and memoranda submitted by the
parties and being fully advised in the premises, and good cause
appearing, now, therefore, the court hereby makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On April 29, 1982, FLP entered into a Concessionaire's

Lease with the United States of America, Department of the
Interior to act as a concessionaire on United States government
property.

This property is located at Callville Bay in the

Lake Mead National Recreation area, within the State of Nevada.
2.

Paragraph 20 of the Department of Interior Lease pro-

vided the United States Secretary of the Interior with the
option of requiring a completion bond for any construction work
performed on their leased Callville Bay property.
3.

The United States Secretary of the Interior did not,

at any time, require a completion bond for any work relating to
the Callville Bay Marina.
4.

The only third party benefits claimed by Neilson and

Astro under the Department of Interior lease were those allegedly provided under paragraph 20 of the lease.
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5.

On December 14, 1934, FLP entered into a General

Construction Contract with Marinas Internationale., a ^ ? irginia
corporation, for construction of a marina on Callville Bay,
I *ake Me •.
6.

Nevada.

The base dollar amount for the construction of the

marina per the General Contract between FLP and Marinas
Internationale was $2,

The General Contract also

contained a mechanism whereby Marinas Internationale was to be
paid an amount for anchoring the dock system, based upon actual
cost, but not to exceed $101,740.00.
7.

The General Contract between FLP and Marinas

Internationale provided that the marina was to be completed no
later than June 12, 1985.
8.

On March 1, 1985, Marinas Internationale entered into

a subcontract with Neilson, entitled "Installat-1 on Contract",
whereby plaintiff was to perform services relative to the construction of the marina.
9.

The Installation Contract between Marinas

Internationale and Neilson required Marinas Internationale to
pay $150,696.00 for the installation of the dock, which was
based on a price of $1.75 per square foot : / feet of dock.

... .quare

The Installation Contract further required

Neilsor ,/" s *ork t< ) be completed by May 31, 1985, incorporated by
reference the provisions of the contract between FLP and
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Marinas Internationale, and required Neilson to be bound
thereby.
10.

On March 11, 1985, Neilson began to perform as subcon-

tractor at Callville Bay in the assembling and construction of
the marina"s floating dock system.
11.

On March 28, 1985, a change order to the contract

between Marinas Internationale and Neilson was issued requiring
Neilson to fabricate and provide certain anchor blocks on the
marina at an additional cost to Marinas Internationale of
$41,211.00
12.

Beginning with the original down payment in December

of 1984, and continuing through February, March, April, May and
to June 10, 1985, FLP paid a total of $2,109,168.50 to Marinas
Internationale for materials and labor involved in the construction of the marina.
13.

On June 13, 1985, Marinas Internationale, the general

contractor, filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code.

FLP had no prior knowledge or warning

of this action.
14.

After the bankruptcy filing, Neilson refused to

perform further work unless some measures were taken to ensure
payment to him for such work.

On June 21, 1985, a joint

accommodation was reached among Neilson, FLP, and Marinas
Internationale whereby Neilson would be paid by joint check
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(pay ab 1 e t o Ne i 1 s on an d Mar inas Int e rnat: i ona 1 e) based u p o n t ime
and m a t e r i a l invoices to be submitted.

Neilson proceeded

and

c o n t i n u e d to perform work on this basis until August 26, 1985,
w h e n h e w a s ousted frwm the project

lor nonpayment

id

State

i n s u r a n c e fees.
15.

On July 9, 1985, a severe storm arose in the Lake M e a d

area and extensively damaged the m a r i n a , which was still under
c o n s t r u c t i o n at the time.
16.

On July 15th, FLP met w i t h N e i l s o n and discussed

d a m a g e repair work.

storm

Prior to the storm, FLP had paid a total

of $52,132.70 in joint checks to M a r i n a s

Internationale/

Neilson.
17.

On August 26, 1985, N e i l s o n was ordered to cease p e r -

forming construction work in N e v a d a by the State

Industrial

Insurance System of Nevada for nonpayment of insurance p r e - •
miums.

Thereafter, the remaining m a r i n a construction and storm

d a m a g e repair work was completed b y FLP usina its own work
forces.
18.

O n October 26, 1985, the Department of the

acknow] edged complet ion and gave approval to open

Interior

approximately

one-half of the slips at the C a l l v i l l e Bay marina.
19.

On January 6, 1986, the Department of the

N'a tiona ] Park: Ser /i ce

Interior,

acknowledged completi on of and gave its

approval to open the completed m a r i n a .
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20.

FLP suffered significant economic loss in the form of

additional project completion expenses and lost profits from
slip rentals and other sources.
21.

In addition to payments for storm damage repair, FLP

paid the following amounts for the construction of the Marina:
$2,109,168.50

52,132.70

Total of joint checks paid prior to the
storm of 7/9/85

70,000.00

Paid to Jessop Bros. Construction Co.
for erection of Marina roof.

36,000.00

Paid by FLP to B&C Steel for the final
truck load of steel.

$2,267,301.20

22.

Total of checks paid to Marinas
Internationale prior to the bankruptcy
filing.

Total paid by FLP for completion of
Marina, exclusive of payments for storm
damage.

The agreement between FLP and Marinas Internationale

contained provisions for the benefit of materialmen such as
intervenor Astro Steel and such persons were intended third
party beneficiaries of said contract.
23.

The damages sustained by Astro Steel which are

supported by the evidence amount to the sum of $101,300.00,
together with prejudgment interest thereon.
24.

Pursuant to the provisions of the agreement between

FLP and Marinas Internationale, FLP is entitled to liquidated
damages thereunder for late/noncompletion of the marina
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construction project, which, together with the economic loss
set forth in Finding of E act 20 (above), more than offset the
damage sustained by Astro Steel.
From the foregoing f i ndi i igs of fa :: 1: 11 Ie coui: t draws the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LA^f
1.

A binding contract existed between defendant FLP and

the United States Department of Interior
2.

A binding contract existed between FLP and Marinas

Internationale.
3.

A binding contract existed between Marinas

Internationale and Neilson.
4.

Any rights and 'oi : obiigati ons which existed between

FLP and Neilson were covered by express written agreements
which preclude any recovery by Neilson based upon a theory of
unjust enrichment.
5.

The record contains insufficient evidence for the

court to determine damages attributable to a claim of unjust
enrichment by Neilson.
6.

FLP paid a substantial sum for completion of the

Callville Bay marina and therefore has not been unjustly
enriched by either Neilson or Astro.
J

Under the terms of the Installation Contract, Neilson

agreed t:o assi i in,e a] ] 11 ie obligations t:hat Mari nas Intei:nat:Iona 1 e

had to FLP.

The defenses and liquidated damages available to

FLP under the General Contract excuse FLP from any performance or obligation to Neilson as a third party beneficiary and
preclude any recovery by Neilson.
8.

Both Neilson and Astro, by claiming third party bene-

ficiary status, assume the rights and obligations of Marinas
Internationale and subject themselves to all defenses available
to FLP under the terms of the General Contract.

Marinas

Internationale is in material breach of the General Contract
entered into with FLP.
performance.

FLP is thereby excused from any further

Therefore, neither Neilson nor Astro may recover

as third party beneficiaries to the general contract.
9.

The liquidated and other damages available to FLP

under the general contract offset any third party benefits
claimed by Astro.
10.

Defendant should be awarded a judgment in its favor

and against both plaintiff and intervener in accordance
herewith.
DATED this

/Q

day of September J 1967.

?imothy R. Hanson
'District Court Judge

ATTEST
H. DIXON HiNOUcY

Deptftv Clerfc^
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APPROVE! i >US I'O FORM:
MUELLER, BARRIOS & CHRISTIANSEN

_P-c
amos/PLc.
rneys fpr Intervenor
MADDOX & SNUFFER

By

AJL?^7
Petersor
for Plaintiff

SCMGAH39
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ADDENDUM 3
Court's Ruling of June 16, 1987, (On Rule 4Kb) Utah R. Civ.
P. Motion to Dismiss)

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

OF SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH

3

*

*

*

4
5
6

RONALD K. NEILSON, dba
MARINA MECHANICS ENTERPRISES,
and ASTRO STEEL CORPORATION,
a Utah Corporation,
(Intervenor),

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Plaintiffs,

CiVil No.

C85-6367

Judge's Ruling
June 16,1987

vs.
FOREVER LIVING PRODUCTS,
INC. INCORPORATION,
Defendant.

BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-entitled cause
came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson, a Judge of the Third Judicial District
Court of the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah on the 16th day of June, 1987, at
10:00 a.m., and that the following proceedings were had.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
! 5 K > t T? *V i& *

0006^7

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

Edwin T. Peterson
MADDOX & SNUFFER
64 East 6400 South, Suite 120
Murray, Utah 84107

FOR THE INTERVENOR:

Ray Barrios
MUELLER, BARRIOS & CHRISTIANSEN
Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple, Suite 777
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

George A. Hunt
and Ryan Tibbitts
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP
2

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Well, gentlemen, I

think I'm prepared at this point to rule on the motions
On some of the aspects.

I might need the lunch hour to

work on some others. Rule 4IB in the case tried to the
bench, a motion for involuntary dismissal after the
plaintiffs case, is treated as you're all aware a little
differently.

And I basically say this for the benefit of

the parties who might not be familiar with Rule 41B.
It's treated differently than if there is a jury that's
finding the facts, because the court sits as the finder
of fact as well as the determiner of the law, and plays
that dual role.
i

And so the traditional statement that if there is
any question of fact, and a prima facie case set out, et
cetera, et cetera, at this point in time the court has
the ability, and properly so, to determine whether or not
I'm convinced that —

and decide the case on the merits

based on just the evidence heard, if that can be done.
Now, that doesn't mean I can ignore the evidence that
I've heard by any matter of means.

But I can determine

what the facts are to the extent that I have had evidence
in front of me.
And I think I can rule on some of the motions —
some of the portions of the motion at this point in time.

Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP
3

*

]

2

I tortious interference claim sought by the plaintiff.

3

J think everybody agrees that there is nothing there-

4 ]

Let's take the easy one first, and that f s the

There is no evidence that's been offered to suggest that

5 I there's been any tortious interference.
6

7

I

No proof has

J been offered, and that must fail as a matter law at this
point in time.

And I agree with Mr. Hunt, that there is

8 J an absolute privilege to interfere in a contract where
9

you have an economic interest.

And so even if there was

10 J proof offered, which there was not, of some interference
11

on the part of Forever Living Products and the other

12 I contracts between the various parties that amounted to
13

some type of tortious interference, there is an absolute

14

privilege, so that claim is dismissed.

15
16

Let's talk about the negligence claims as they are
asserted next.

I'm not willing to say at this point in

17 j time that the evidence convinces me one way or the other,
18

when I take the documentary evidence as well as the oral

19 I testimony, that there has been no proof offered that
20

there might be a breach, or that a duty existed.

21

am of the opinion that the controlling law in this case

22

is Nevada law.

23

But I

There is absolutely no reason to apply Utah law, if

24

it's different.

The law that should be applied under the

25

traditional evaluation under a conflicts of law approach

Bunny C. Neuenscnwanaer, C S R , K F K , CJF

is Nevada in this case. And as I look at the Nevada
cases, it clearly says that economic loss is not
available in a negligence theory•

So feven if I assume

that I would be willing to say after I examined all the
evidence that there was a duty created by these various
contracts, or in some other fashion that rises to a
negligence claim, this case is clearly an economic loss,
and it can't be anything else.
And the case that was suggested by Mr, Barrios, it
dealt with property.

And property was the object.

But

here it's economic loss, and that's what breach of
contract claims are all about.

If you have an economic

loss, then those are traditionally and rightfully so,
either statutory or contract law, but not in negligence.
That's a tort. And in this case economic loss cannot be
recooped in a negligence case that is —

that is really

nothing other than the claimed breach of a duty, which is
a tort.
So to the extent that the negligence claims are
asserted, while I want the record to be clear on this,
I'm not saying that a duty has not been shown, because
I'm not convinced one way or the other at this point on
that.

I am satisfied that even if the duty was shown,

this case could not stand in negligence, because it's an
economic loss case, and that's not available in the
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1

negligence theory.

2

claims as well for those reasons.

3

J

4
5

And so I dismiss the negligence

With regard to the oral contracts, gentlemen, I hear
cases day after day after day that deal with oral

| contracts, and they are usually in business settings just

6

like this.

7

frequently with oral contracts.

8

to have to try and determine those, because it would have

9

been so easy to put it in writing.

And so I am familiar with —

10 J that the law deals with —

and have to deal

And it always pains me

And that's the reason

has a number of things that

the court must take into account in deciding whether or
12 I not an oral contract exists, and not the least of which
13
14

is the statute of frauds.
I

And the statute of frauds in this state and others

15

says that if you want to hold somebody else for a —

16

the debt of another, you've got to have it in writing.

for

1? I And to the extent that the plaintiff claims that Forever
18

I Living Products in the meeting in July, early part of

19 I July, promissed to make sure that Mr. Neilsen recooped
20

his losses, you can look at that any direction you want

21 J to look at it, but it's still a promise to pay for

22

someone else's obligation.

And that's exactly the way

23 I these folks were looking at it.
24
25

And frankly gentlemen, it's a lot of lawyers 1 talk
at this point in time now that the case is here to
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1

I suggest something else.

2

' by Marinas International.

3

bankruptcy.

4

He now knew they were in

He wasn't going to get paid by them.

And if

in fact the conversation took place as he suggested, then

5

I he was relying upon Forever Living Products to pay that

6

J obligation to recoop his losses, whatever that means.

7
8

And so if there was an oral contract with regard to
I Neilsen, it had to be for the debt of another, and it's

9

1

Mr. Neilsen expected to get paid

not in writing, and it's barred by the statutes of fraud.

0 I

Additionally, and this is equally as important, the

11

the Supreme Court of various states, including Utah, has

12

I said that you can't enforce an oral contract unless it's

1

3 J definite enough so that you'll know what the terms of it

14

are.

In other words, a vague agreement that is so

15

J unspecific so as to be unenforceable cannot be enforced

16

I in an oral agreement.

17

] it's just good business sense to have writings, and

18

' people don't find themselves in these positions.

19

|

20

I what recoop his losses means, even if it occured.

21

I this stage of the proceedings, that's all the evidence

22

And this just g^ts back to the

But I can't enforce that contract.

there is.

25

I don't know
And at

And I don't have to decide whether whether it

23 I was really said or it wasn't said.
24

—

But taking the

j evidence the way it was, Mr. Neilsen, the only thing he's
been able to say, and I appreciate the parties' candor in
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1

2

this case, but, is that Forever Living Products quote,
J "promissed to recoop his losses."

Promissed to allow him

3

to recoop his losses.

4

enforce that, not in good conscience, because I wouldn't

5

6

And I don't have —

I couldn't

know what number to put on it.
And if I put the $240,000 figure on it that Marinas

7

International was supposed to pay, then it's answering

8

for the debt of another, clearly.

9

So I can't enforce an

I oral contract that one in particular, that is so vague

10 | and so indefinite that I don't know it's terms, because I
11

wouldn't know what to tell the defendant to pay.

12

would just be sheer speculation.

13

with the agreement in August.

14

It

And the same is true

I have trouble with Mr. Taylor's testimony, because

15

he did testify, at least in my judgement, in different

16

ways on different occasions.

17

suggested, that he was tired, and it was a long day is

18

the reason for that.

19

unfortunately, why that was not added to, or why that

20

clarity was not made when the deposition was read.

21

And perhaps the reason he

But that doesn't explain,

But even if I take what was said on the witness

22

stand today, the same problem exists with regard to the

23

August meeting.

It's so indefinite, and so vague that I

24 J can't hold the defendant on an oral contract for that
25

claim that we're going to pay the balance due after
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1

2

Marinas International is now in bankruptcy and sells some
J licorice factory.

There is just nothing there —

nothing

that rises to the level of what the law is going to
impose an obligation on a party who does not agree that
5

I there was an oral contract.

And I think the law is

pretty clear on that.
With regard to the portions of the contract where
8

9
10

11

I Mr. Neilsen claims that there is still some amounts owing
as a result of —

I forgot the exhibit number, but it f s

I the letter that is really in my judgement an estimate of
what's going to occur in the future, I don't really see

12

I anything inconsistent about that.

13

I agreement to continue on basically a cost plus situation,

14

| submit the bills as they come along, do the work that

15

I changed to storm damage.

What I see is an

But Mr. Hunt is correct.

The

16

only evidence before me is that by the time Mr. Neilsen

17

left the job, and left the job I might add not at the

18

fault of Forever Living Products, because those were

19

amounts that were not paid long before this bankruptcy

20

ever occured on workmen's comp premiums, and that's the

21

| reason that he was forced off the job by officials in

22

I Nevada, between the time he started the work, and between

23 I the time he left the job, he basically put it back in the
24

condition it was before the storm, and he got paid for

25

it.

Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP

I

When the agreement says that you have —

that the

2

payroll is going to be in a range, and here's the rest of

3

the bill, and you submit the payroll each and every week,

4

and you get paid for what you submit, and you get paid

5

for what is on the estimate in addition, and there is no

6

evidence to the contrary that he wasn't paid all those

7

amounts, he got paid everything he was entitled to.

8

if it had of gone on in the future, that would be

9

something else.

Now,

But Mr. Neilsen was forced off the job,

10

not at the expense, or —

11

word, forced off the job, but not because of the fault of

12

anything Forever Living Products did.

13

well, expense is the wrong

I know he said that the bill had to be paid.

It

14

wasn't their responsibility to pay it.

15

long before there ever was a bankruptcy, and Marinas

16

International got everybody in trouble.

17

That was back

So I can't enforce any of these oral promises, even

18

to the extent that they exist.

19

too indefinite.

20

contract was created by the estimate that was signed by I

21

believe it was Mr. Ham on behalf of Forever Living

22

Products for the work that went on after July, that Mr.

23

Neilsen has recieved everything that he is entitled to.

24
25

They are too vague and

I'm also satisfied that to the extent a

I'm not as clear, gentlemen, and I'm not willing at
this point in time, because I don't feel that I have

—
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while I've looked at them, I don't ffeel that I've studied
the contracts clear enough, and have them in mind to the
extent that I'm ready to rule at this stage of the
proceedings, even if there is no othfer evidence, it
doesn't make any difference, I'm still not ready to rule
on the questions of quantum meruit, and third party
beneficiary, except to the extent that the third party
beneficiary claims are based on oral contracts.
Those must be dismissed, because I find there are no
oral contracts, at least none that the law is willing to
enforce.
So here's what we'll do, gentlemen.

Take the noon

hour, give some thought to my rulings at this point in
time, and let's see where we are wiph regard to further
evidence, whether or not that may be necessary, and what
claims still remain, and we'll talk about them further
after lunch.

I'll see you back here at 1:30.

We'll be

in recess.
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2
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3
4
5
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13
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14
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15
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16
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

3

THE COURT:

The record will show we continue in

Nielsen and others is versus Forever Living Products

4
C85-6367.

The record will show that all counsel are

5

present, and some of the parties are present.

6

will further reflect this is the time set for ruling on

7

the remaining issues in this case.

8
9

The record

Gentlemen, since we broke at noon in addition to
| getting some lunch, and taking care of another short

10

matter, I spent the remaining portion Iof the time on this

11

case to give some additional consideration to not only

12

your supplemental briefs, but the arguments that you all

13

presented at the time —

14

this morning> closing arguments.

I f ve tried to look at the matter in some detail, and

15

all the issues you've raised, and gave them all some

16

thought to reaching a decision in this case.

17

I want you all to know that I reinforce what I said

18

as we closed.

19

briefing the court on the various legal issues involved,

20

and presenting your cases.

21

those cases that it's difficult not ohly from the

22

parties' standpoint, they are all it difficult from that

23

standpoint, but the court's standpoint because the real

24

person —

25

should be responsible for all the claims that have been

I think you all did an excellent job on

Unfortunately this is one of

real entity that ought to be here, and who
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7

asserted is not, and that's Marinas International.

And

they filed bankruptcy, and whether we like it or whether
we don't, the federal bankruptcy laws prohibit them from
having to respond at least directly in this jurisdiction
in this suit.

Perhaps they'll respond somewhere else

another day, but not today.
So that makes it difficult, because basically what

8

we're considering is in one degree or another, looking at

9

who should bear the loss amoung the various parties who

10
11

are still viable entities, and not in bankruptcy.
So with that comment in mind, let me get back to the

12

issues.

13

two theories that are being asserted by both the

14

plaintiff, and the plaintiff in intervention that the

15

court has considered not only while we were in recess at

16

the close of the evidence last two weeks, but also this

17

afternoon.

18
19

There is really no question about it, there are

And those are the third party beneficiary

theories, and the unjust enrichment theories.
I don't think there is —

I don't think anybody

20

really argues that those theories are mutually exclusive.

21

If there is a third party beneficiary, and there is a

22

contract upon which the third party beneficiary might

23

lie, of course there can not be unjust enrichment.

24

law is clear you can't have —

25

have a contract implied in law if in fact there is a

The

obviously so, you can't
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1

2

3

4

contract.
So I think everybody agrees to that.
I record to reflect that.

But I want the

I've tried to make some notes of

the various theories, and let me deal first with the

5

plaintiff Nielsen, Marine Mechanic's claim of third party

6

beneficiary.

So that you understand, gentlemen, it's not

7

J my intent to cover everything that's been said during the

8

course of this trial, and closing arguments, or we'd be

9

here for another five days, but merely to hit upon those

10 | points.

And the reason I like to rul^ from the bench is

n

because I think the attorneys and parties are entitled to

12

know what's going through my mind, and I like to go on

13 J the record as opposed to some written document that may
14

or may not encompass what I think ought to be said for a

15

number of reasons, not the least of which is the support

16

facilities we have to do that and the time constraints.

17I i don't have two or three law clerks, and multi18

secretaries and things to do, and pl^s a case load of

19

three or four hundred cases.

20

so with those things in mind I think rulings from

21 J the bench are better, and I try to do it, and I'll do it
22

23

| in this case.
So with regard to plaintiff Marine Mechanic's third

24

party beneficiary claim, it is without dispute that

25

Marina Mechanics had a contract with the general
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contractor, Marinas International, and that's Exhibit 3.
And that contract was entitled Installation Contract, and
it also developed into supplying some steel as well.

But

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, Installation Contract outlines the
rights and obligations that rain between Marinas
International, and Marina Mechanics.

Plaintiff's Exhibit

3 says in article 5A that Marina Mechanics agrees to be
bound to Marinas International, and assume to Marinas
International all the duties that Marinas International
has to the owner, and that's Forever Living Products.
So the long and the short of that agreement, and
what Mr. Nielsen agreed to when he signed it is that he
agrees to undertake all the obligations that Marinas
International had to the owner, Forever Living Products.
In other words, placed in the position —
Marinas International.
not the point.

in the shoes of

Whether he intended to or not is

The point is he did it in this

Installation Contract, so apparently he could get the
contract to do this job.
When this thing started, nobody suspected it was
going to go awry.

So with respect to Marina Mechanics by

it's own contract, it's agreed to assume all Marinas
International's obligations towards Forever Living
Products.

And to the extent that that has occured, and

it has occured by the terms of the contract, Marina

Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP
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1

Mechanics must therefore stand responsible for any

2

defenses that might be raised for Marinas International f s

3

J breachs to Forever Living Products.

4

I t f s not a matter of whether or not the law requires

5

that.

6

Steel.

7

agreed to do that by contract under Plaintiff's Exhibit

8 I 3.
9

I 1 11 deal with that later when I talk about Astro
As far as Marina Mechanics is concerned, they've

And clearly those breachs are numerous, and Mr. Hunt

enumerated some of them that were found in the evidence,

10

and I likewise find that, not the least was which not

11

finishing the project on time or for that matter at all.

12

The liquidated damage comes in, the additional

13

expenses to complete the project, loss of rents, and

14

other profits that were discussed by the witnesses, if

15

not in some specific detail, I believe they were specific

16

enough so that I can rely upon them,

17

substantial amount that Forever Living Products lost as a

18

result of Marinas International's breaqhs, numerous in

19

number.

20

ithere was a

And so because Marina Mechanics has agreed to stand

21

for those if it claims third party beneficiary under that

22

contract, by it's own agreement, it has agreed to stand

23

in the shoes of Marinas International.

24

breachs have occured, Forever Living Products is not only

25

excused from performance, but the offsets and defenses

Bunny c. Neuenschwander, CSft, RPR,

CP

And where those

would prohibit any recovery on third party beneficiary in
that regard.
And that is especially true when you examine
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 further under article 5 subpart (I)
Marina Mechanics agrees that the obligations under
article 5, which include payment to Marina Mechanics from
Marinas International, do not create any obligation on
the part of the owner to pay Marina Mechanics,

So even

if the defenses and setoffs and excuses from performance
that Forever Living Products was entitled to assert
against Marinas International were not enforceable
against Marina Mechanics, certainly the agreement on the
part of Marina Mechanics not to look towards the owner
prohibits them from asserting any third party claim or
any claim at all based on the contracts.
Based upon that, it's the court's conclusion that
the law in this case, as well as the facts, and the facts
really aren't disputed in this case in any substantial
amounts, but generally the facts are disputed, there can
be no third party action on the part of Marina Mechanics
against Forever Living Products under the contract
Exhibit D40 which is the agreement between Forever Living
Products and Marinas International.
To the extent that there is still being a claim
asserted, no one except Mr. Hunt really addressed it, but
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1

just so the record is clear, to the extent there is a

2

third party claim

3

4

—

third party beneficiary claim under

J the contract between Forever Living Products and the
Department of Interior on the bond issue, the evidence is

5

undisputed that the provisions in that agreement

6

requiring a bond were never required, and therefore that

7

created no benefit under which either for that matter

8

Astro or Marina Mechanics could make a claim for a third

9

party beneficiary claim.

10

beneficiary claim there.

11
12

So there is no third party

So on that issue I find against Marina Mechanics and
in favor of Forever Living Products.

Qn the unjust
i

13

enrichment claim, as I've indicated, there cannot be a

1^

contract implied in law if there is a contract in fact.

15

There was a contract in fact here between Marina

16

Mechanics and Marinas International, and to a substantial

n

extent the contract was substantial, Exhibit D40, the

18

contract between Marinas International, and Forever

19

Living Products was incorporated into Exhibit P3, so

20

there was a written agreement.

21

So for that reason alone, there can be no unjust

22

enrichment.

But rather than just resolve it on the basis

23

of what one might view to be a technicality,

24

considered it further.

25

effort to try this case I think you ought to know what I

I ! ve

And after I've gone through the
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1

think about the equity position as well.

2

were not a bar because there is a written agreement, I am

3
4

Even if there

not satisfied that elements of unjust enrichment as far
as Marina Mechanics is concerned has been proven.

The

5

burden of proof does rest upon the parties asserting the

6

claim in this case and that's the plaintiffs, the

7

plaintiffs and plaintiffs in intervention.

8

under the general facts of this case as they relate to

9

Marina Mechanics and Forever Living Products, I can see

10

no reason in equity that I ought to shift the burden of

11

responsibility to pay in this case.

12

I can see

It's unfortunate that Forever Living Products has

13

paid already once, and it's unfortunate that Marinas

14

International did not pay Marina Mechanics, but I can see

15

no reason to shift that burden to Forever Living Products

16

in this particular case, particularly when you take a

17

look at what was going on.

18

site.

19

firsthand knowledge.

20

delivered, at least had a better opportunity than Forever

21

Living Products.

22

shifts, and that ultimately happened.

23

late payments, and some problems with payment that Mr.

24

Nielsen experienced from Marinas International, and he

25

was aware of that.

Marina Mechanics was on the

Marina Mechanics knew what was going on.

They had

They knew what materials were being

They agreed that there may be double
There were some

He was aware of the problems with
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1

J payroll and so on through the month of May, at least

2 !

3

I

4

i

through the latter part of May,
I also note that he made a claim for not in his
.

individual capacity but as Marina Mechanics, made a claim
5

| for materials in 25 that in fact had not even been
delivered.

8
9

On the other hand, you have Forever Living

Products who has a contract with the general who is
I supposed to oversee this project, and see that — and see
J on behalf of the owner, part of the agreement, that the

10

work was progressing, subcontractor is getting paid, and

11

I all those things that are encompassed in Exhibit D40, the

1

2 I contract between the two.

1

3 J

And absent something extraordinary that should draw

14

it to the attention of Forever Living Products, some

15

serious problems on the part of the general contractor,

16

Marinas International to do what they are supposed to do,

17

| until the bankruptcy occured, and I think it's undisputed

18

i that no one realized the bankruptcy was coming except

1

9 I Marinas International, I can see no reason to shift the

20
21

burden of proof in equity.
Finally, I think I need to make A comment with

22

regard to damages claimed under the unjust enrichment

23

theory by Marina Mechanics.

As I look through the

24 J evidence, while there has been evidence in Exhibit P25
25

that suggests what was being claimed, there is no way
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7

that I can determine between or in Exhibit 25 what
damages might be attributable to a claim under the
contract or claim outside the contract, that is unjust
enrichment.
And while I understand it would be difficult to
prove, the law is clear in my judgement, that difficulty
of proof does not relieve the party responsible for

8

making that proof, in this case the plaintiff, from that

9

obligation.

10

And there is one final thing that I think is

11

important with regard to unjust enrichment.

12

know that Nevada has specifically addressed this, and

13

Nevada law does control, but where the owner has paid for

14

the work in it's entirety, and I find that Forever Living

15

Products did pay for the work in it's entirety, the

16

Nevada courts, and I'm bound by Nevada courts whether I

17

agree with it or not, they say you don't have to pay

18

twice.

And I don f t

And I can find nothing, and there has been no

19

authority suggested that —

20

may not like it, and that isn't a good enough reason, to

21

suggest that under the facts of this case, even if there

22

was a somewhat premature payment on the part of Forever

23

Living Products of the full contract price that that

24

should change the law as enunciated by the Supreme Court

25

of the state of Nevada, which says you don't pay twice

other than the fact that we
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1

under unjust enrichment claims under circumstances like

2

this.

3

4

I

I think the cases that are cited ^rom the
defendant's brief, there is the Joseph case, and the

5

Bowyer case are despositive of the issue of unjust

6

enrichment, and also despositive with the situation with

7

8
9

| regard to third party beneficiary.

So on both the claims

that are asserted by Marina Mechanics against the
i defendant I find those issues against the plaintiff, and

10 j in favor of the defendant, Forever Livina Products, no
11
12

cause of action.
With regard to the plaintiff in intervention, Astro

13

Steel, the evidence that I've heard in this case are in a

14

distinctly different position than Marina Mechanics.

15

First let me take up the issue of unjust enrichment.

16

There was no written contract, so I cannot say that there

17

could be no contract implied in law because there was a

18

written contract, because there was not a written

19

contract.

20

Products has paid out the full contract price, and as

21

I've indicated, I find that to be the case, paid out more

22

than the full contract price as a matter of fact, the

23

equity would place Astro in a different position.

24
25

And but for the fact that Forever Living

As I've indicated, Nevada law says that once the
owner has paid the full amount, thut there can be no

Bunny C. Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP
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1
2
3
4
5
6

recovery in unjust enrichment.

And the cases I've

indicated say that, as I cited with regard to Marina
Mechanics' claims, the ones cited in Mr. Hunt's brief.
just can't find a legal reason to carve out an exception
because of premature payment.

If there is one, I have

not been cited any authority that would suggest that's

7

correct, nor am I able to find any in the time that I've

8

had available to look.

9

So there can no exception, I choose not for carve

10

one out on my own volition.

11

the plaintiff in intervention's claim on unjust

12

enrichment I must find in favor of the defendant, and

13

against plaintiff in intervention Astro on that issue.

14
15
16
17
18

So therefore with regard to

With regard to Astro Steel's third party beneficiary
claim, there is no question in my mind that the contract
Exhibit D4 0 between Marinas International, and Forever
Living Products deals with the benefits that run to
materialmen, such as Astro Steel.

I recognize the fact

19

that Forever Living Products may not have been actually

20

aware of Astro being involved in a specific fashion, but

21

certainly they knew or should have been aware that

22

someone was going to supply some steel to this project,

23

and someone was supplying steel for the roofing.

24

As a matter of fact they paid for it —

25

I

part of if.

paid for

And in looking at the status of the law in
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14

1

Nevada on what must be proven for a third party

2

beneficiary such as Astro in this case, it appears that

3

I those general elements have been met.

And that Astro

4

does fall into the category of a third party beneficiary

5

to the contract between Marinas International, and

6

Forever Living Products.

7

There is only one —

and if that's where it ended, I

8

would find in favor of Astro Steel, and I'll talk about

9

the damages and improving in a moment.

But if that's

10 j where it ended, Astro would be entitled to recover the
11 I damages they have proven.

But as I read through the

12

briefs again this afternoon, I noted that the cases cited

13

by Mr. Hunt in his brief regarding Nevada law dealing

14

with whether or not a third party beneficiary must assume

15

and stand in the shoes absent a contract —

16

Mechanics of course agreed to do that by contract —

Marina
but

17 I absent a contract, whether or not a third party
1

8

beneficiary would have to stand in the shoes of a

19 i defaulting party to the contract they are seeking the
20

benefit from, it appears to me that Nevada law says you

21

must.

22

supplemental brief, the Morelli case, and the Britton

23

versus Groom case, and the Gibbs versus Giles case.

24
25

And those cases are cited on page 7 of Mr. Hunt's

I've seen no authority that would suggest that that
is not the law in the state of Nevada, which is
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15

1

applicable to this case. And so accordingly the same

2

reasoning applies as to Marina Mechanics as applies to

3

Astro Steel under that case law, at least it's been cited

4

to me, and as I read the quotes from the Nevada Supreme

5

Court, as well as the Nevada Supreme Court citation of

6

approval of an Oklahoma case that deals with that issue.

7

Those defenses again raise the question of liquidated

8

damages, raise the question of late and no completion,

9

and all those other matters that have been discussed.

10

And not only does that relieve Forever Living Products

11

from obligations to perform under that contract, then

12

that would be payment.

13

offset the damages that have been proven by Astro on the

14

steel that was delivered.

15

Those defenses would clearly

Let me speak to that briefly so that it's clear how

16

I reached that conclusion.

17

shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the value

18

of the product that they delivered, the second steel,

19

less the last truck load was $101,300.

20

satisfied that they've proven that they are entitled to

21

prejudgement interest, but only at statutory rate. There

22

being no evidence of what the statutory rate is in the

23

State of Nevada, I think the rules of law require me to

24

assume that the prejudgement interest rate in the State

25

of Nevada would be the same as it is in the State of

I'm satisfied that Astro has

I'm also
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1
2
3

4
5

Utah,
While no one has briefed that, I believe that to be
J the law.

The fact that only the owner of Astro Steel

testified to that amount, and he said this is my invoice,
J I think I can draw from that a reasonable inference that

6

that is the reasonable value of that steel.

7

much discussion at the hearing, or much evidence, and

8

much discussion about what damages went beyond that, and

9

I there was testimony as I recall regarding the fact there

There was

10 J hadn't been bonuses for the principles, and employees for
some period of time; there had been interest on notes
12 I that had been taken out to satisfactory a judgement,
13

interest on the judgement that the supplier to Astro had

14

claimed; that there were ongoing leasing costs, there

15

were no raises, equipment needed updating, a lot of

16

generalities that were discussed, but I heard nothing in

17 i the form of specific dollar amounts.
18

And absent some special expertise from the owner, I

19 I think proof in that regard to satisfy me that there were
20

some additional consequential damages that Astro had

21

shown beyond the $101,3 00, there would have to be either

22

an accountant or someone who could come down and
I

23

translate all those things into dollars, and that did not

24

occur.

25

points.

So I'm not satisfied that proof was met on those
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1
2
3
4

So that the record is clear, the only damages that I
could find that have been proved by the requisite
standard of proof were the $101,300 plus the prejudgement
interest, and those are all offset by just liquidated

5

damages.

6

Nevada law seems to say that Astro Steel must accept all

7

the bad along with the good in the contract.

8

is some merit to that position.

9

accept the benefits of the contract, then perhaps you

10

ought to take the distasteful portions along with it.

11

That doesn't count the other matters that

And there

If you're going to

But in any event, whether I agree with that or not

12

is irrelevant.

13

I'm bound by that.

14

I'm of the opinion that third party beneficiary status

15

should be allowed to Astro Steel because of those

16

defaults on the part of Marinas International of the

17

contract under which they claim third party beneficiary

18

status does not allow recover, and I find on both the

19

unjust enrichment and the third party beneficiary in

20

favor of the defendant, and against Astro Steel.

Nevada Supreme Court so indicated, and
So accordingly, even though otherwise

21

Mr. Hunt, I'm going to ask you to prepare the

22

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on all the

23

issues, of course.

24

court's order on the rule 4IB motion.

25

those, on the merits, although I don't know that that

We need to deal differently with the
I did rule on
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1

will entail a lot of Findings of Fact, but to the extent

2

Findings of Fact are necessary, and they are required

3

J under that rule, that will be appropriate, the questions

4

of law as to whether or not there was a cause of action,

5

I specifically the negligence claim.

6
7

We need to deal with those so it's clear in the
J Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the ones

8

that address the 4IB motion and the two remaining issues,

9

the Findings and Conclusions and the judgement on the

10 j unjust enrichment and the third party beneficiary.
11

All

right. Anything I have neglected to cover?

12

MR. HUNT: No, Your Honor.

13 I

THE COURT: We'll be in recess.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

3
4

)
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

)

5
6
7
8

I, BUNNY CAROL NEUENSCHWANDER, do hereby
certify:
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter,

9

License No, 152, and one of the official court reporters

10

of the State of Utah; that on the 1st day of July, 19 87,

11

I attended the within matter and reported in shorthand

12

the proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said

13

shorthand notes to be transcribed into typewriting, and

14

the foregoing pages, numbered from 3 to 19, inclusive,

15

constitute a full, true and correct account of the same

16

to the best of my ability.

17
18
19

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 11th day of
July, 1987

20
21
22
23

BUNNY CI )L NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR, CP'
My Commission Exj res:

24

December 5, 1987

25
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ADDENDUM 5

General Contract between FLP and Marinas Internationale,
dated December 14, 1984 (Trial Exhibit D-40)

SALIIS (CONTRJCCT

*

j Contract No-

3ate
BILLING INFOP^VTION
?l"OieCt N a m e

rnlhnllP

SHIPPING INFORMATION

RnY

Marinn

Address

"ustomer pnr^vpr Rp«nrt.«
address

mnn

Mpvada

Hyw

Jity Boulder Titrate
Jountrv

N v.

Ship to

^nitp 9 0 7

Zip 33005

Pnllville Jay Mnrina
Hnv ion .Star Rt_ JD

city _ L ;is Vprn.9 Stat? NV.
Country
uaa

P 8912-

Phone(

Contact

USA

Zi

)

____________—__________________

PRODUCT
Marinas Internationale, Ltd. (Company) agrees to provide the following
materials and equipment according to the attached specifications ar^.
marina plan entitled
Cnllvillp Rav Marina - 12/7/84 (annrox.79,000 s
ana in accordance with the WOHK AND DLiLIVtlRY SCMKDULE.
~*~"
PRICE
I
The Customer agrees to pay for the following according to the PAYMENT
SCHEDULE:
Product

Pricp

Floating Docks:
0
Laminated marina decking,
thickness to be
4 "
°Pol'/ethylene pontoons,
f r e e b o a r d t o be 1 6 " - 1 7 '
°Dock f o n d e r ( s p e c i f y )
0

Polyurethane

foam

°Dolts, c l e a t s ,
pile guides
°Othcr n e c e s s a r y
per plan
(id'Kjways

hardware,
Trital

S1,776,085.00

(specify) :

not
not i n c l u d e d
Utilities:
113,710.00
Anchoring
Other:
—\-93rrWi Sn-«Q
Assembly & I n s t a l l a t i o n
included
Hoof TSaoaicture p e r p l a n
TOTAL
F r e i g h t ( c i r c l e ) C . I . F . , C_F, K.O.B.
Common C a r r i e r , F . 7 \ . S . , C . O . D . , £ t

$307,675.00

included
TOTAL

$2,083,700.00

Customer acrees t o pay . a l l a w p l i c a b l o Dermit. fcos
d u t i e s and t a x e s , - w h e t h e r s a l e s , U S P 3 8 a # e r r & G O i ? p r k \ - ^ Y r V ^ f n d o n VA 22070 U S A
„
e x c i s e o r o t h e r 7 0 3 / 6 ° 9 ' 2 o 0 ° T e l e x " 248762 M A R I N A UP Coble Mannas Int E X H I B I T
A
Concord. CA • Ff Myers. FL • Chicago. IL • SI Louis M p • New York. NY • Houston. TX
Auslrclia • Schrair' • Hong Kong • Kuwait • Saudi Arcbbic • United Arab Emirotes
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Date

3.

December 10, 198U

Project Name

Callvllle Bay Marina

WORK AND DELIVERY SCHEDULE
Work

Delivery

Materials begin to arrive at
job site within

30 days from contract execution

Detail design complete and
assembly begins

^5 days from contract execution

Breakwater, C, D, and E piers
rnmnlptpd

to allow

for

boat

rentals - (approx. 5/1 assuming
12/12/8*4 contract execution) MI portion only.

Does not

account for utilities
installation

150 days from contract execution

-Final completion i acceptance

18_0 days from contract execution

4 . PAYMENT SCHEDULE
% Due

Amount Due

Upon These Conditions

Materials :
10?

$188,979.50^

Initial deposit, indicating execution
of contract

90%

$1 ,700,815.50

Due per payment terms as materials
are delivered to Job site

Total

$1,889,7<*5.00
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Labor:
90%

$171,555.00

10%

$19,HO.00

Total

$193,865.00

Due per terms as work in completed
Due upon final completion

Total amount of contract $2 ,083,760 .00 •(
The Customer shall make progress payments to the Company as
follows: 10% down with order and irrevocable letter of credit in favor
of Marinas Internationale, Ltd, with authorized draws based on receipt
of materials and work performed.

The Customer will be Invoiced upon

the Contractor issuing purchase orders.

However, payment shall be due

7 days after materials arrive on' site or upon arrival at a mutually
agreed upon storage area, according to a statement of values which wll.'
be issued at the time contractor Issues purchase- orders.

If payment 1,

delayed beyond ten (10) days of when due, the contract price snail,
without prejudice to the Company's right to immediate payment, be
increased by 1 1/2% per month on the unpaid balance, but not to exceed
the maximum amount permitted by law.

Owner agrees to provide bank

references and/or financial statements as Company may require.

All

prices quoted are valid for ninety (90) dajys .
5.
v.

DELAYS
.The Company shall be excused for, delay' in performance due to any

;cause

beyond its control, including .tout";'-hbt/ limited to fire, flood, a<

of God, war, act of government, act "or .orp^ssion of Customer, strike_bj
labor trouble.

The time of performance/shall be extended for a time

>e;qual to the period of the delay, and it^^S'nsequences^

-II-

6.
y

TITLE AND INSURANCE
Title to the products and 'risk of loss or damage shall pass to,/

Buyer upon tender of delivery, except that a security Interest in the i
product or any replacement shall remain ^p Company, regardless of mode
Of. attachment to realty or other property, until the full price has
been paid in cash.

Buyer agrees to do allnacts necessary.to pe r fect^j

and maintain said security interest, andv;^to protect Company's interest^
by .adequately insuring the product(s) against loss or damage from any /
external cause with Company named as insured or..co-insured, _Marinas^ /
Internationale agrees to pay the deductible for any such claims.
7.

/

STORAGE COSTS
Any part of the marina product which must be stored due to delay

caused by the Customer will be placed in storage by the Company at cost
and risk to the Customer
8.

WARRANTY
The Company warrants to the Customer that the following materials

supplied by the Company will be free from defects under normal use and
service for a period of five (5) years from date of installation:
fender, foam, bolts, cleats, anchoring guides, and a ten (10) year
warranty on the pontoons*

Company will furnl.-sh, repair or replace

without cost to the Customer any part, assembly or portion thereof
which shall be determined to be defective.

The laminated plank carries

a 30 year limited warranty against decay which Is provided by the
manufacturer of the preservative treatment.

Tin* Company provides a 5

year warranty against defects in the laminated plank provided

recommended maintenance is followed,
recommended maintenance details).

(See Spec ifications for

The Company provides a 5 year

warranty on the roof materials and design.

Other, separately listed

Items such as utilities products and components, gangways, pilings and
other accessories shall be covered only by the express warranty of the
manufacturer or supplier thereof.

The Company will not be responsible

for consequential or incidental damages.
9.

PENALTY
Company agrees to accept penalty clause of $800.00 per day,

$4,000*00 per week for delays in meeting performance schedule In
accordance with paragraph 5 of contract, "DEJLAYS" .
10.

J3KCJUR_ITY .INTEREST
The Company reserves and the Customeer grants to the Company a

oecurity Interest in the marina materials and all proceeds thereof for
the purpose of securing the balance of payments due under this
Contract.

The Customer agrees to sign any financing statements which

the Company deems reasonably necessary to protect this Security
Interest.

The Company is also granted an Irrevocable power of attorney

to execute such financing statements on the Customer's behalf.

This

Security Interest shall terminate when the bustoiner has satisfied all
of its obligations under this Contract.
11 .

SITE PREPARATION
Customer agrees to provide and prepare a s u u a m e assembly site

for construction according to specification:* to he provided by Company,
This site will include utilities and any special use permits, if

-(,-

needed.
12.

SHORESIDE COSTS
Customer agrees to assume shoreslde and bulkhead preparation cost

associated with installation, including utility services and gangway
assembly.
13.

CHANGE ORDER
Design alterations after (Purchaser's) approval of final pier and

utility configuration will be done only through written change order.
(Purchaser) may sub.nlt a request Vov change order detailing anticipatec
or desired alteration.

Marinas Internationale will then inform the

Purchaser of the impacts, If any, of rhe proposed alteration on the
cost and schedule of materials delivery.

Acceptance, in writing, of

these by (the Purchase]*) will constitute an approved change order and a
contract modification.
Ik.

SALES CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT
The Company and the Customer agr»'»: to the following additional

contract terms and details:
a.

Customer to provide adequate sqju'rity and is responsible for i

, loss due to theft or vandalism.'*

Company.+ %$ responsible for loss duetto
.^ »•

-•

•-»•- ..J»JV.I •

•

» " — - *~-**-

damage during shipping, assembly and installation.^
b.

..,..•.-

» • •*•

7

Customer to provide electricity and lighting necessary to

assemble during nighttime if needed to complete marina on schedule.
c.

Gale Drimhall or other personnel as approved by Customer to

pt-rform monthly on-.;lU> Q.C. 1 nsport, 1 on during Installation.
d.

Company agrees to provide Customer* the marina anchoring system
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at coat in an effort to :;ave money.

The price of $113,710.00 is

Customer's estimated cost of the anchoring and agrees to pay to the
Contractor any additional costs over $113,710.00 up to the amount of
$215,^50.00.

Contractor agrees to pay for any anchoring costs over

$215,^50.00.
e.

/ 0 / / 7 V O CuFfrcTt^cT-

The contract price of $2,083,760.00 is based upon Customer

providing materials and services which are listed in letter from K.
Larson to R. Ham dated 10/16/8*1.

Company will allow further agreed

upon deductions if Customer can provide additional materials or
services to Company.
15 .

M^R^lEjnNG^JS_UPPOK T
Company

to provide marketing s*ippcrl ar'.ii assistance to Customer tc

I ncJ urie :
. National

Park Service

presentation

. Display dock and pictures for use in sales
of slips
. A color rendering of project to be used
for promotion and sales
. Reasonable on-site assistance and training
to arslst Customer in meeting their marketing
objectives .
1 6.

ilT^Lm^^liS^IGN
Company agrees to prlvlde complete utility designs and

specifications

to Customer for its use In

Request Irv, quotations.

Company agrees to cooperation with utility contractor In expediting
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utllity installation.

GENERAL CONDITIOMS

Marinas Internationale is herein known as COMPANY and/or CONTRACTOR.
Forever Resorts is herein known as CUSTOMER and/or OWNER.

17.

CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
The Contract Documents consist of this Agreement with General

Conditions, Supplementary and other Conditions, the Drawings, the
Specifications, accepted alternates and all Modifications after
execution of the Contract such as Change Orders, written
interpretations and written orders for minor changes in the Work.

The

intent of the Contract Documents is to include all items necessary for
the proper execution and completion of the Work.

The Contract

Documents are complementary, and what: is required by any one shall be
as binding as If required by all.

Work not covered in the Contract

Documents will not be required unless it is consistent therewith and
reasonably inferable therefrom as being necessary to produce the
intended results.
17.1

Execution of the Contract by the Company is a representation that

the Company has visited the site and is familiar with the local
conditions under which the Work is to be performed.
17.2

The Work comprises the completed construction required by the

Contract Documents and Includes all labor necessary to produce such
construction, and all materials and equipment Incorporated or to be
Incorporated In such construction.
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18.

CUSTOMER
If the Company fails to correct defective Work or persistently

fails to carry out the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents,
the Owner, by a written order, may order the Company to stop the Work,
or any portion thereof, until the cause for sucn order has been
eliminated; however, this right of the Customer to stop the Work shall
not give rise to any duty on the part of the Owner to exercise this
right for the benefit of the Contractor or any other person or entity.
19.

COMPANY
The Company shall supervise_and direct the Work, using the

ucmpdny's best skill and attention, and ttt$ Company shall be^solelyt*
responsible for all construction means, methods, techniques, sequences
and procedures and for coordinating all bcfirtions of the Work under the

[Contract. \
19.1

Unless otherwise specifically provided in the Contract Documents,

the Company shall provide and pay for all labor, materials, equipment,
tools, construction equipment and machinery, water, heat, utilities,
transportation, and other facilities and service:: necessary for the
proper execution and completion of the Work, whether temporary or
permanent and whether or not Incorporated or to be incorporated in the
Work .
19.2

The Company shall at all times enforce strict discipline and gooc
i

order among the Company's employees and aha!1 not employ on the^WoMc,'*\
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19.3

The Company warrants to the Customer that all materials and

equipment incorporated in the Work will be new unless otherwise
specified, and that all Work will be of good quality, free from faults
and defects and in conformance with the Contract Documents•! .All Work 1
not conforming to these requirements may be"considered defective.
19^

The Company shall give all notices and comply with all laws,

ordinances, rules, regulations, and lawful orders of any public
authority bearirg on the performance of the Work, and shall promptly
notify the Owner if the Drawings and Specifications are at variance
therewith .
19.5

The Company shall be responsible to'.the Customer for the acts and

omissions of the Company's employees, Subcontractors and their agents
and employees, and other persons performing any of the Work under a
•contract with the Company.
19.6

The Company shall review, approve and submit all Shop Drawings,

Product Data and Samples required by the Contract Documents, The Work
shall be in accordance with approved submittals.
19.7

The Contractor at all times shall keep the premises free from

accumulation of waste materials or rubbish causal by the .Company's
operations*

At the completion of the Work the Company shall remove all

such waste materials and rubbish from and about the Project as well as
the Company's tools, construction equipment, machinery and surplus
materials.
19.8

The Company shall pay ail royalties ;and license fees; shall/

defend all suits or claims for Infringement of any patent rights and
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shall save the Owner harmless from loss on ^account thereof.
19.9

To the fullest extent permitted by./lfiy, vthe Company shall

indemnify and hold harmless the Customer^ and(' his agents and employees
.from and_against all claims, damages, losses1and expenses, including

,

but not limited to attorney's fees arlsing^out of or resulting from the
performance of the Work, provided that anv/,>such claim, damage, loss or
expense (1) is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease or

s

death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than
the Work^ltself) Including the loss of use^-'resuiting therefrom, and (2)
is caused in whole or In part by any negligent act or omission of the
Company, any Subcontractor, anyone directly or indirectly employed by
any of them or anyone for whose acts any of them may be liable.

Such

obligation shall not be construed to negate, abridge, or otherwise
reduce any other right or obligation of indemnity which would otherwise
exist as to any party or person described ,in this paragraph 19.9 in any
and all claims against the Customer or any' of his agents or employees
by any employee of the Contractor, any Subcontractor, anyone directly _
or indirectly employed by any of them or anyone for whose acts any of
them may be liable, the indemnification obligation under this Paragraph
19.9 shall not be limited in any way by any limitation on the amount or
type of damages, compensation or benefitsjv.p&yable by or for the
Contractor or any Subcontractor under Workers1 or Workmen's
Compensation Acts, disability benefit actsv< or other employee benefit
acts.
19.10

'
Company to accept responsibility for wages, workman's
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compensation, insurance, etc. as necessary for all personnel it
employees while performing assembly and installation.

Customer agrees

to cooperate, if possible and without risk, to any assistance to
company it can provide relative to conforming with State of Nevada
contract and labor requirements.
20.

SUBCONTRACTS
A Subcontractor is a person" or entity-who has a direct contract \*

with .the Contractor to perform any of. theuWork at the site./
V

.

.

20.1

.

.

<

•

,

' •,'

•

.

.

-

•

•

,

.

.

!

Unless otherwise required by the Contract Documents or in the

Bidding Documents., the Contractor, as soon as practicable after the
award of the Contract, shall furnish to the Owner in writing the names
of Subcontractors for each of the principal portions of the Work.

The

Contractor shall not employ any Subcontractor to whom the Owner may
have a reasonable objection.

The Contractor shall not be required to

contract with anyone to whom the Contractor has a reasonable objection.
Contracts between the Contractor and the Subcontractors shall (1)
require each Subcontractor, to the extent^of1. the Work to be perranmed
pby the Subcontractor, to be bound to,the.:Cpii.tractor. by the terras of_the^
'-'- . . . . . . . » . .

- •

.

.........

."Contract Documents, and to assume toward;^h$: Contractor all ..the
jobllgations and responsibilities which'the/Contractor, by these .'::
Documents, assumes toward the Owner, and. ^^allow to the Subcontractor
the .benefit, of all rights, remedies 'andV^dress' afforded to the
Contractqr_by_these Contract.Documents.}

-13-

21.

WORK BY CUSTOMER Oft BY SEPARATE CONTRACTORS
The Customer reserves the right to perform work related to the

Project with the Customer's own forces, and to award separate contracts
In connection with other portions of the Project or other work on the
site under these or similar Conditions of the Contract.
21.1

The Company shall afford the Customer and separate contractors

reasonable opportunity for the introduction and storage of their
materials and equipment and the execution of

their work, and shall

connect and coordinate the Contractor's Work under this Contract with
theirs as required by the Contract Documents.
21.2

Any costs caused by defective or ill-timed work shall be borne by

the party responsible therefor.
22,

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
The Contract shall be governed by the law of the place where the

Project is located.
?3.

PAYMENTS AND COMPLETION
Payments shall be made as provided in *4 . of the Agreement*

/23.1

Paymen?s<ma^be withheld on account oV (1) defective Work not:

remedied, (2) claims filed, (3) failure of the Contractor to make
payments properly to Subcontractors or for labor, materials or
equipment, (4) damage to the Owner or another contractor, or (5)
persistent failure to carry out the Work iri accordance with the
Contract Documents,
?3.?

j

Pinal payment shall not be due until the Contractor has delivere

to the Owner a complete release of all liens arising out of this

'

-14-

'Contract or receipts in full covering all'Vl'abor, materials and
• equipment for, which a lien could be f i l e d ^ r a bond satisfactory to
,lthe Owner indemnifying the Owner against ,any lien. /If any lien remains
'unsatlsified after all .payments :are'made/Pt-he; Company shall refund to
the Customer^all monies the latter may ,be ..compelled to pay in
discharging such lien, including &\V costs-ifand reasonable, attorney' s fees. , •
23.3

The making of final payment shall constitute a waiver of all

claims by the Customer except those arising from (1) unsettled liens,
(2) faulty or defective Work appearing after Substantial Completion,
(3) failure of the Work to comply with the requirements of the Contract
Documents, or (4) terms of any special warranties required by the
Contract Documents.

The acceptance of final payment shall constitute a

waiver of all claims by the Contractor except those previously made in
writing and identified by the Contractor as unsettled at the time of
the final Application for Payment.
2H.

PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY
The Company shall be responsible for*, initiating, maintaining, and

supervising all safety precautions and programs in connection with the
Work.f The Company shall takcall reasonable precautions for the safety
of, and shall provide all reasonable protection to prevent damage, »*
Injury or loss to (1) all employees on th(? Work and other persons who
may be affected thereby, (2) all the Work^pnd all materials and
equipment to be incorporated therein, and/(3) other property at the
site or adjacent thereto.

The Company shall give all notices and

-15-

~comply w^th_appllcable laws, 'ordinances, "rules, regulations and orders
of any publlc^authority bearing on the,safety of persons and property^
.and their protection from damage^ Injury [or. loss•

The Contractor shal

promptly remedy all damage or lo.ss to any 'property caused in whole orj
4in

part by the Contractor, any Subcontractor, and Sub-sub-contractor,

or anyone directly, or by anyone^ for ^whos,^ acts any of thera may be

, v

liable,'except damage or loss attributable to the acts or omissions of
the Owner or anyone directly employed by^im or by anyone for whose * "
acts either^of them may be liable, and not attributable^ to the fault o
negligence of the Contractors.
2 'I •

C_HA_NG_ES_ IN THE_ _WOR_K
The Owner, without invalidating the Contract, may order changes 1

the Work consisting of additions, deletions, or modifications, the
Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, and the Contract Time being adjusted
accordingly.

All such changes in the Work shall be authorized by

written Change Order signed by the Owner,
2*4.1

The Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, and the Contract Time may b

changed only by Change Order.
2*4.2

The cost or credit to the Owner from a change in the Work shall

be determined by mutual agreement.
25-

TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT
If the Contractor defaults or persistently falls or neglects to

carry out the Work In accordance with the Contract Documents or falls
to perform any provision of the Contract, the Owner (may, after 30 day1
writen notice to the Contractor, make good such deficiencies and may

-16-

deduct the cost thereof from the payment then or thereafter due the
Contractor or, at the Owner1s option that sufficient cause exists to
Justify such action, may terminate the Contract and take possession of
the site and of all materials, equipment, tools, and construction
equipment and machinery thereon owned by the Contractor and may finish
the Work by whatever method the Owner may deem expedient; and if the
unpaid balance of the Guaranteed Maximum Cost, if any, exceeds the
expense of finishing the Work, such excess shall be paid to the
Contractor, but if such expense exceeds such unpaid balance, the
Contractor shall pay the difference to the Owner,
26.

ACCOUNTING RECORDS
The Contractor shall check all materials, equipment and labor

entering into the anchor/winch system and shall keep such full and
detailed accounts as may be necessary for proper financial management
under this Agreement.

The Owner shall be afforded access to all the

Contractor's records relating to this anchor/winch system.
27.

SPECIFICATIONS
Company agrees to provide all materials In accordance with its

published materials specifications sheet, copy attached.
28.

ENTIRE CONTRACT
This Contract, Including the SALES CONTRACT SUPPLEMENT where

applicable, constitutes the entire Contract between the Customer and
the Company regarding the purchase of the marina materials noted above.
This contract supercedes any prior written or oral agreements. This
Contract may only be amended by a written Instrument executed by both
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parties.

Marlnas International^?, Ltd.

C u s t om eVCALL/JLLF

AA\Z

0A/VVtf

./>//j

Date:

Date
Customer warrants that the
specifications and marina plan have
been approved and are herewith
attachedl

m(initial)

mmmmMsmmm
ADDENDUM # 1

DURA-TREET'STRUCTURAL LUMBER
THIRTY-YEAR LIMITED WARRANTY CERTIFICATE
DURA-TREET* STRUCTURAL LUMBER when used for the construction of home, farm or
light industrial structures carries with its purchase a warranty for thirty
years from the date of purchase which covers damage by termites or decay
that would make the lumber structurally unfit for the application for which it
was used. Should the lumber fail for one of the preceding reasons, the
orininal purchaser will be entitled to receive new DURA-TREET* STRUCTURAL
LUMBER on a pro-rated basis in exchange for the termite or decay damaged
lumber. To make arrangements for this exchange, the original purchaser must
send the original purchase invoice showing the^date of purchase, the name of
the treater, the name of the inspection agency, and showing that sufficient
DURA-TREET* STRUCTURAL LUMBER has been purchased to cover the number of board
feet claimed to be damaged, to:

DURA-TREET'STRUCTUUAL LUMHKK
IDACON, INC.
10611 HARWIN DRIVE, SUITE 400
HOUSTON , TEXAS 77036
Warrantor shall not be liable hereunder for damage to UURA-lRFrT 1 STRUCTURA!
1 UMBER used in foundation systems, in water immersion applications, in unusual
soil conditions, or for uses other than in home, farm, or light industrial
applications, warrantor shall not be responsible for damage from any cause
other than termites or decay. Warrantor shall not be liable for any installation
or reinstallation costs, or the natural characteristics of some wood to check,
warp, or twist, or for any incidental or consequential damages, and warrantor
shall have no further liabilities or obligations hereunder, except as expressly
stated herein. Nothing in this limited warranty is intended to, or shall change
the duration of any warranties express or implied, or shall give purchaser any
express or implied warranties he would not otherwise have, extend either beyond
their customary duration, or make warrantor liable for any express or implied
warranties that it would not be liable for if tins limited warranty had not been
given*
Since some states have not recognized the limitation of implied warranties,
the above period of duration and/or limitation of incidental and consequential
damages may not apply to your purchase and may give you rights in addition
to the specific legal rights granted herein.
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ADDENDUM #2
CONTRACTOR'S PROJECTED ANCHORING COSTS

50 A frames

$420.00

Misc Shackles, blocks, clips

$21,000.00
35,350.00

50 Winches

650.00

32,500.00

80 Anchors

375.00

30,000.00

Additonal engineering

15,000.00

Freight
34,000' cable:

8,500.00
2.15
15,000 static lines

32,250.00

10,000 anchor lines

UP ,850.00
$215,450.00

ADDENDUM 6

Installation Contract between Marinas Internationale and
Marina Mechanics (Trial Exhibit P-3)

INSTALLATION CONTRACT

/-•tee

A ^ / c A / ' f ' I ' r /$><-•/

This Agreement, made this 1st day of March, in the year
Nineteen Hundred and 85, by and between Marinas Internationale,
Ltd-, hereinafter called the Contractor, and Marina Mechanics
Ent., hereinafter called the Subcontractor.
Witnesseth, that the Contractor and Subcontractor for the
consideration hereinafter named aaree as follows:
ARTICLE 1.

The Subcontractor aarees to furnish all equip-

ment and perform all work for the installation of the floating
docks for the Callville Day Marina in accordance with the
General Conditions of the Contract between the Owner and the
Contractor and in accordance with the Drawings and Specifications
prepared by Marinas Internationale, Ltd., all of which Drawings
and Specifications, signed by the parties hereto form a part
of a Contract between the Contractor and the Owner and hereby
become a part of this contract.
ARTICLE 2.

The Subcontractor and the Contractor aaree that

the work to be done is as follows:
Marinas Internationale will deliver
to the job site by Callville Bay.

all parts and components

Marina Mechanics Ent. is to

provide labor for the foaming (Dick Wyke will machine fill each
pontoon) of the pontoons, assemble the docks, complete with all
hardware, float them in place and temporarily anchor them so they
'are*protected from damage.
ARTICLE 3.

The Subcontractor aarees to complete the several

portions and the whole of the work herein sublet as required by
the Contractor and the Owners.
a reasonable period of time.
May 31, 1985.
ARTICLE 4.

This work is to be completed in

Callville Bay is to be installed by

Two shifts may be necessary to accomplish this.
The Contractor aarees to pay the Subcontractor

for the performance of his work the sum of $150,696 which is based
on 86,112 square feet of deck area times SI.75 per square foot.

INSTALLATION

CONTRACT

Page 2

$20,000 will be paid in advance for mobilization and acceptance
of this contract,
ARTICLE 5,

The Contractor and Subcontractor agree to be

bound by the terms of the Agreement, the General Conditions,
Drawings and Specifications as far as applicable to this subcontract, and also by the following provisions:
The Subcontractor agrees (a)

To be bound to the Contractor by the terms of the

the Agreement, General Conditions of the Contract, the Drawings
and Specifications, and to assume toward him all the obligation:
and responsibilities that he, by those documents, assumes
toward the Owner.
(b)

To submit to the Contractor applications for payment

in such reasonable time as to enable the Contractor to apply fox
payment*
(c)

Marina Mechanics Ent. is to provide sufficient insuran

including workmen's compensation insurance, libility insurance,
etc., to hold Marinas Internationale, Ltd. free and clear of
all claims or damages until the dock units have been accepted
by the using agent.

Marina Mechanics Ent. will be responsible

for any damages arising out of the contract
Marina Mechanics Ent.

work performed by

All work is to be completed in a good

workmanship manner and Marina Mechanics will clean up all work
areas and leave them in the condition they were in at the time
*of this contract.
The Contractor agrees (d)

To be bound to the Subcontractor by all the obligations

that the Owner assumes to the Contractor under the Agreement,
General Conditions of the Contract, the Drawings and Specifications.
(e)

To pay the Subcontractor the amount allowed to the

Contractor on amount of the Subcontractor's work to the extent
of the Subcontractor's interest therein.
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INSTALLATION CONTRACT

(f)

To pay the Subcontractor so

that at all times his

total payments shall be as large in proportion to the value
of the work done by him as the total amount certified to the
Contractor is to the value of the work done by him.
(g)

To make no demand for

liquated

damages or penalty

for delay in any sum in excess of such amount as may be specifically named in the subcontract.
(h)

To give the Subcontractor an opprotunity to be

present and to submit evidence in any arbitration

involving

his rights.
The Contractor and the Subcontractor agree that (i)

In the matter of arbitration, their rights and obli-

gations and all procedure shall be analogous to those set forth
in this contract.

I

Nothing in this article shall create any obligation on the
part of the Owner to pay or to see the payment of any sums to ^
any Subcontractor.
In Witness Whereof, the parties hereto nave executed this
Agreement, the day and year first abc 2 written.

J,
Thomas T. Allgyer
Executive Vice!President
Marinas Internationale, Ltd.

<J

Ron Nielson" /
President
/
Marina Mechanics Ent,

MARINAS INTERNATIONALE, LTD.
Contractor

APPENDIX
1.

THE WORK

In general, floating docks and components shall be furnished
by Marinas and delivered to the 30b site. Contractor shall offload same, store them and assume responsibility for their securi
The Subcontractor shall not install the anchor system, but shall
suoply all labor, tools and eauipment requirea to assemble and
temporarily anchor docks so they will not be damaged.
Subcontractor shall assemble floating docks in conformity with specifications and drawings provided by the office of Marinas at
380 Herndon Parkway, Suite 1900, Herndon, VA
22070.
-11 ^ork under this contract, other than of floating dcc<s components furnished by Marinas, shall be performed strictly in
accordance with the specifications and drawings supplied by
Marinas unless otherwise agreed in writing.
Should the Subcontractor determine that variance exists oetween
these specifications and drawings and the actual site conditions,
this information shall be furnished to Marinas immediately upcn
discovering that sucn a variance exists.
Construction specifications are as follows:
(1)

All butt joints to be tight f i t t m c with gaps not to exceed
1/8".

(2)

All plank to be stored in a manner that will not cause twist
mg.

(3)

All
the
the
too

(4)

All exterior of pontoon scraped clean of excess urethane.

(5)

All gouqes in wood caused from handling to be repaired
with wood filler.

(6)

All the surface of the docks to be coated with a wood sealer
provided for by Marinas. Special emphasis should oe made on
any wood that has been drilled or cut after pressure treatmer

(7)

Cut off extra foam from pontoon low enouah that the pontocn,
when laqgea to the underneath side of the decking, will be a
tight fit around the eages.

bolts holes to be drilled straight, so as to not cause
bolt head to be drawn at an angle into the surface of
wood. All bolts should be drawn down tightly, but not
tight so as to cause them to dig into the wood.

APPENDIX
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(8)

2.

When stapling on dock fender, it must be pressed tightly
against the edge of the dock. When stapling fender on,
the ain pressure must be regulated such that the top end of
the staple does not penetrate through the lip of the fender,
eliminating fender power. Installer shall stretch the dock
fender before stapling to prevent sagging. All dock fender
should be stapled on the top and bottom on 3" centers.
TIME FOR COMPLETION
The Work shall beqin upon signing of this Agreement and shall
be completed by May 31, 1985.

3.

CONSTRUCTION MANAGER
Bill Graham shall act as representative of Marinas Internationale and shall supervise the progress and performance of
the Work in Marinas' behalf. Construction Manager shall at
all times have access to the worksite and to any portion of
the Work being performed hereunder.

4.

USE OF WORKSITE
Subcontractor shall confine its operations at the worksite
to areas permitted by law, ordinances, permits and the Contract
Documents and shall not unreasonably encumber the site with
any materials or equipment. The Subcontractor shall take the
necessary precautions to protect all properties from damage
and shall leave the property in a condition at least equivalent to the condition found.

5.

CLEANING UP
Subcontractor shall at all times keep the worksite and
surrounding premises free from accuiulation of waste materials
or rubbish caused by its operations, such as, for example,
urethane foam residues. On completion of the Work, Subcontractor shall remove all waste materials and rubbish from
and abount the worksite, as well as all tools, construction
equipment, machinery and surplus materials, and shall leave
same "broom-clean" or equivalent. If subcontractor fails to
clean up, Marinas may do so and charge the cost thereof to
Subcontractor.

6.

SAFETY OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY
Subcontractor shall take all reasonable precautions for the
safety of, and shall provide all reasonable protection to
prevent damage, injury or loss to:

APPENDIX
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(a)

All employees on or about the worksite and all other
persons who may be affected thereby;

(b)

The Work and all materials and equipment to be incorporated therin, whether in storage on or off the worksite, under the care, custody or control of the Contra
or any Subcontractor; and;

(c)

Other property on or about the worksite, including tre
shrubs, lawns, walks, pavements, roadways, structures
and utilities.

Subcontractor shall comply with all applicable laws, ordinances,
rules, regulations and orders of any public authority having
jurisdiction for the safety of person or property and shall erec
and maintain, as recuired by existing conditions and progress of
the Work, all reasonable safeguards for safety and protection,
including posting danger signs and other warnings against hazard*
7.

ASSIGNMENTS
Subcontractor shall not assian this Contract or any of its
interests hereunder, nor shall this contract be assigned
or transferred by operation of law, or by any process or
proceeding of any court, or otherwise, without the consent
of Marinas being first obtained. If subcontractor is a
corporation, then any merger, consolidation or liquidation
to which Subcontractor is a party, or any change in the owne
ship of or power to vote the majority of Subcontractor's
controlling stock, shall constitue an assingment for purpose
of the Contract. Subcontractor cannot subcontract without
prior written authorization.

8.

Written notice under this Contract may be delivered or
mailed. If delivered, they shall be delivered in person
to Subcontractor or an authorized representative thereof.
If mailed, they shall be sent certifeid or registerd mail
to the parties*at the following address or to such other
address as either party may hereafter designate in writing
to the other party.
To Marinas:

Marinas Internationale, Ltd.
380 Herndon Parkway, Suite 1900
Herndon, Virginia 22070
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To Subcontractor:

9.

Marina Mechanics Ent.
c/o Ron Neilson
8537 Scottish Drive
Sandy, Utah 84092

ARBITRATION
Should any dispute arise out of the interpretation, construction or performance of this purchase order if the same is
accepted, such dispute as a condition prior to any litigation
shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the then
existing Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Buyer retains generally all right and remedies
granted to it by operation of law in addition to those set
forth herein.

1B1-71^
CONTRACT AMENDMENT

U

This following agreement was made this day of March 28, in
the year nineteen hundred and 85, by and between Marinas
Internationale, Ltd. and Marina Mechanics, Ent.
Article 1.

Marina Mechanics, Ent. agrees to fabricate the
following anchor blocks per detailed drawings:

Description

3 of Anchors

Large Anchors

Cost Per Anchor

Total Cost

144

$268.00

38,592.00

27

97.00

2,619.00

Ancnors

TOTAL

$41,211.00

Article 2.

Marina Mechanics, Ent. agrees to provide
Marinas Internationale, Ltd. a credit of
$3,001.20 (410 man hours at S7.32 per hour)
if Marinas Internationale, Ltd. provides the
laborers needed for fabrication.

Article 3.

Estimated time of completion of these anchors
is 17 days based on 3 men working 8 hours per
day.

Article 4.

Marinas Internationale, Ltd. agrees to pay
progressive payments as work is completed and
invoiced.

JL.

r >i.

Thomas T. Allgj^r
Executive Vice(President
Marinas Internationale, Ltd,

'7, luc ,t L :;y
Date

Ron Nielsor
President
Marina Mechanics, Ent,

2-5c
Date

)>>

ADDENDUM 7

Payment Requests 1-6

(Trial Exhibits P-12, 16, 20, 21, 24 and 25)

8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE
SANDY, UTAH 84092
(801)942-1832

DATE: 3-13-85

UEST FOR PAYMENT .£ I

RI: Job #A101-KEV,

MARINAS INTERNATIONALE LTD.
| Herndor. Parkvay
ndon, Virginia 22070
N: Tom Allgyer

.tract Reference: Callville Bay Marina/UWe head, Nevada

150,696.00
30li, 900.00
(FENDING)
-0155,596.00

LK ASSEMBLY BASI CONTRACT:
Slf ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT:
SHORING CONTRACT:
ANGE ORDERS TO D*TE:
TnL CONTRACT TO DATE:

MOBILIZATION
ital Contract to Date

20,000.00

% Work Complete

20,000.00

ie This Invoice

TuTni-

210.300.00

195,296.00

155,596.00

103,329.00

U,237.00

127,566.00

103,329.00

h,237.00
(
-0- )

127,566.00
( 20,000.00)

000

-t Invoice to Date
2°> -°°
i « Previous Billing (PD) 120,000-002

U&jh

MnTERlAL

(

-0-

-0-

)

103,329.00

Authorized Signature,

I,237.00

$107,566.00

hfrrftL

feke Check Payable t o : Marina Mechanics Ent.

•MM
WITNESS:\>\?\\;u\
CAROLYNISUUJVAN CSR/RPR

8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE
SANDY, UTAH 84092
(801) 942-1832

RECUEST FOR PAYMENT #2

Date: 3-?5-85

TO: MAR3NAS INTERNATIONALE LTD.
3P0 Herndon Parkway
Herndon, Virginia 22070
ATTN: Ton Allayer

RE: Job #A101-Mev.

Contract r e f e r e n c e : C a l l v i l l e Bay Marina/Lake Mead, Nevada
DOCK ASSEMBLY BASZ CJNTEACT:
ROOF ASSEK5LY BASE CONTRACT:
ANCHORING CONTRACT:
CHANGE ORDERS TO IUTE: (SEE ATTACH.)
TOT^L CONTRACT TO *%TE:

150,696.00
30ii,90C.CO
(PENDING)
1,1148.02
1*56,71:1:. 02

ffiSILIZATIJi'

MATir.lAi

LABOR

TOT* I

20,000.00

21:0,300.00

195,296.00

1:55,596.CO

Jhange orders t o Date ( a t t a c h ) ( - 0 - )

(-0-)

1,11*8.02

1,11:8.02

Base contract to Date

Total Contract t o Date

20,000.00

21*0,300.00

196,Uhh.02

1:56,71:1:.02

36% Work Complete

20,000.00

103,329.00

1:1,098.61

16L,L27.£L

20,000.00
(20,000.00)

103,329.00
(103,329.00)

i l l , 098.8L
( It,237.00)

161:, 1:27.81:
(127,566.00)

Net Invoice t o Date
Less Previous Request
Pue This Invoice

-0-

36,861.81*

I 36,86l.«h
;•? >2

i)
Authorized Signature,
Make Check Payable t o : Marina Mechanics Ent.
Sincerely,
MA&Si* MECHANICS ENT.

jnald K. Keilso*
Owner
F.KN/sn
Enclosure

•JZ0«i

V

L/

8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE
SANDY, UTAH 84092
(801) 942-1832

BS:UESr FOR P.-.Y.MEJ.'T J 3

Date h-29-85

TO: MnP.EIAS INTERNATIONALE LTD.
3ti0 Herndon parkway
Herndon, V i r g i n i a 22070
ATTII: Ton; Allgyer

RE: Job # rt 101-Nev.

C o n t r a c t r e f e r e n c e : C a l l v i l l e Bay Marina/Lake Keaa, f/evscs
$150,696.00
301,900.00
62,c'60.CC

DOCK ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT:
ROOF ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT:
AIXiiORr.'o 2«JE CONTRACT:
AMENDMENT n (CONCRETE ANCHOR SLOCKS]
flrtCK CHARGES TO DATE:
TOTAL CONTRACT TO D*TE:

1,11*3.02
3557,013.02
MATERIAL

MOBILIZATION
Dock Assexoly
Roof Asseraoly
Anchoring
Amendment #1
Eack Charges
T o t a l C o n t r a c t t o Date:
Work Complete t o Date.
Net I n v o i c e to Date
Less P r e v i o u s Requests
Due T h i s

Invoice

(20,000.00)

iil,5ii6.oo
2hO,30CCO
17,860.00
30,709.30
-0360,1*15.00
139,872.00
139,872.00
(119,081a.00)

89,150.00
6^,600.00
5,000.00
2,500.00
l,Ui8.02
lo2,39«.02
11*3,122.02
13,122.02
(33,1*82.0*0)

^'157000.00. J

V20Jfi8.0O-

9,6L0.02
P^_

20,000.00
-010,000.00
5,000.00
-035,000.00
35,000.00

35,coo.co

cn~>
Authorizated S i g n s t u n
Make Check Payable t o : Marina Mechanics Ent,
Sincerely,
MAriDnPlMECHArilCS ENT

Ronald K. lieil
Ovner
RK>!/tIn

JAz

TOT.-vl
150,696.00
30li, 900.00
62,860.00
38,209.60
1,11:0.02
557,613.C2
217,99ii.C2
217,991.02
(172,566.00)
$ 15,125.02

8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE
SANDY, UTAH 84092
(801)942-1832

REQUEST FOR PAYMENT itlx

___________

JDate 5-20-65

——

I

TO: WkTTuxS INTERNATIDNALE LTD.
380 Herncon Parkway
Herndon, V i r g i n i a 22070
ATTN: Tom Allgyer

RE: Job #A101-Nevada

C o n t r a c t r e f e r e n c e : C a l l v i l l e Bay Marina/Lake Mead, Nevada
$150,696.00
30ii, 900.00
101,530.00
1x1,211.00
li,569.97
§602,976.97

LOCK ^ L ^ L Y BACE CONTRACT:
RDuF ASSEi-lbLY bASE CuNTIiJiCT:
ANCHORING J A S E Gu.! TRACT:
AhOL.\i.T ffl J A S E COMTUCT:('/-.N'ChJK)
SACK CHnhJ^b To UTE:
TOTAL CUNTRACT TO UTE:

1

MjrilLII^T:^,'
Dock Assembly
Roof Asremcly
Anchoring
Amendment #1
Back Charges
T o t a l Contract t o Date
Work Comnlete to Date
Net Invoice t o Date
Less Previous Requests
Due T h i s Invoice

20,000.00
-010,000.00
5,000.00
-035,000.00
35,000.00
35,000.00
35,000.00)

M^TLKLII,

1x1,51x6.00
21x0,300.00
1^7,860.00
30,70,.80
-0360,U5.tfo
173,198.60
173,198.60
(139,672.00)

-0-

33,326.80

L.j djR

ToT-^L

150,696.00
89,150.00
6 1 , 6 0 0 . 0 J OliO, 9C0.CC
101,550.00
la3,720.CO
1x1,211.00
5,501.20
lx,589.97
b,559.97
;207,561.17
602,976.97
68,581.17
276,779.97
63,581.17
276,779,97
(: 1x3,122.02, (217,99L.Q2)
25,1x59.15

S 58,785.95

Enclosed p l e a s e find breakaown of overtime cost for payr-oll.
o»

Make Check Payable t o : MARIN* MECHANICS, ENT.
Sincerely,
MAREM^ MECHANICS ENT.

Ronald K. NeilsJ
Owner
RKN/gn
Enclosure

J<-<tC>

00

^^,° '^

l°,0O6^

<2

S/zzfgi

~ir /,"•
S'/S/Jti

8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE
SANDY, UTAH 84092
(801) 942-1832
REQUEST FOR PAYMENT US

DATE

6-12-85

TO: MARINA'S INTERNATIONALE LTD.
380 Herndon Parkway
Herndon, V i r g i n i a
22070
ATTN: Tom A l l g y e r

REt JOB 0A1O1-NEV

C o n t r a c t Re: C a l l v i l l e Bay M a r i n a / L a k e Mead, Nevada
$150,696.00
304,900.00
101,580.00
41,211.00
28,686.15
$627,073.15

DOCK ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT:
ROOF ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT:
ANCHORING BASE CONTRACT:
AMENDMENT * 1 BASE CONTRACT: (ANCHOR)
BACK CHA:.CcS TO DATE:
TOTAL CONTRACT TO DATE:
MOBILIZATION
Deck As-u.-nol.,
20,000.00
Roof Assemcly
-0Anchoriruj
10,000.00
Amendment n
5,000.00
Backcharges
-0T o t a l C o n t r a c t t o Date 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0
Work Complete to Date
35,000.00
N e t I n v o i c e to Date
35,000.00
Less P r e v i o u s R e g u e s t s ( 3 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 )
Due t h i s

Invoice

-0-

MATERIAL
41,546.00
240,300.00
47,860.00
30,709.80
' 44,569.60
364,985.40
198,698.40
198,698.40
(173,198.80)
25,499.60

LABOR
89,150.00
64,600.00
43,720.00
5,501.20
24,116.55
227,087.75
152,627.75
152,627.75
(74,795.22)
77,832.53

Enclosed p l e a s e f i n d breakdown o f o v e r t i m e cost on p a y r o l l
Make check p a y a b l e t o : MARINA MECHANICS, ENT.
Sincerely,

MARIN? MECHANICS ENT.

'Ronald K. .'Jei'lsoh

TOTAL
1 5 0 , 6 9 6 . .00
3 0 4 , 9 0 0 . .00
1 0 1 , 5 8 0 . .00
4 1 , 2 1 1 . .00
2 8 , 6 8 6 , .15
6 2 7 , 0 7 3 . ,1b
3 8 6 , 3 2 6 . ,15
3 8 6 , 3 2 6 . ,15
( 2 8 2 , 9 9 4 . _02
$103,332.
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8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE
SANDY, UTAH 84092
(801)942-1832
RECUEST FDR °AYMENT # 6

D*tr :

TO: MARINAS INTERNATIONALE LTD.
i57A O r l i s l e Drivn
Herndon, VA. 27070
ATTEN: Tom Allgyer

RE: JOB #A101-N*v.

Contract R P :

O l l v i l l c Eoy Marin*/]>.ke Mr*<i, Nevada

DOCK ASSEMBLY BASE CONTRACT:
ROOF ASSEMBLY BASF. CONTRACT:
ANCHORING BASE CONTRACT:
AMENDMENT # 1 BASE CONTRACT: (ANCHOR)
SACKCHARGFS (TO 6-11-85)

Ji5O.696.OO
?0£,900.00
101,580.00
LI,211.00
7/.,^.c-9

TOTAL CONTRACT TO DATE:

*572,70 1 .59
MOBILIZATION

Dock Assembly
20,000.00
Ro->f Assrnbly
-0Anchoring
10,000.00
Amendment-?1
5,000.00
•Jnckchprgrs
^
T o t s l C o n t r a c t to Drtp ?5,000.00
Work Comnlrtr to D.-tr ^5,000.00
Nrt Invoicp t o Date
35,000.00
Less P r e v i o u s Pnymcnts(^5,000.00)
Dur This Invoicr

-0-

M-kp Chrck o.-v:>blc t o : MARINA
Sincprrly,
MARIN/ UECFIANICSTJT.

I n-uUAj.'M-^
Owner
RO/m

6-12-35

MATERIAL

Labor

Tot-1

M , 5^6.00
2/0,300.00
17,300.00
''0,709.00
IP^QPJO
372,7 1 3.70
^07,/3.2.70
°07,/-57.20
(173,198.80)

89,130.00
hi ,600.00
/3,720.00
5,501.20
6?,01?.19
?6i,9Sc.,9
190,523.^9
190,37 / , .' , 9
(7/.,795.27)

130,696.00
*>0/ ,900.00
1
0l,900.00
n,?ii.00
7/ . ^ U . ' P
672,701. 9
5°2,975.59
3°2,975.59
(737,99/.Q?)

1°/,? r />.,A0

115,72S.17

2 / 9 , 7 9 / . 37

MECHANICS ENT.

ADDENDUM 8

Accommodation Agreement between FLP and Marina Mechanics
dated July 4, 1985. (Trial Exhibit P-32)

8537 SCOTTISH DRIVE
SANDY, UTAH 84092

h July 1985

Richard Ham
TATIVILLE BAY hi .'H'J 6 MJHtlJ
LUJ 100 S t a r K uLi.. 1L
Lds Vegas, Nevada 8°12ij
RE: Weekly Estimated Cost for Labor and Equipment t o complete C a l l v i l l e bay Marina
i d i s c u s s e d i n meeting with Ten H±cr, Rich ham id Ron an1 " n l l i p N P I 1 ^ - ' - , TT
Ml i , 19P C .

&12,OOQ.OO - 15,0GC.0u
t ) tqmpnent

Cont j/ujency
10L CiK Compressor
CV 150 F o r k l i f t
j&ochor Bar^e
Gennrator

jtU, L

Ja95^o

85o#oo
6oo.ro
230.( 0

2,675,00

Fool ft Repair E t c .
5) S u b s i s t e n c e , Office Overhead
lood
Phone
Auto
Insm

5 ) Salary
R e s p e c t f u l l y SuDiuiiiteQp
L MECHANIC, MfK

Ronald k. N^il4on
Owner

1 0 0 , XJ

?5.oo
2I10.00
100.00
125.00
6ii0. io

ouu.uu
1.150.00
$17,690.00- 20,690.00

CER'iii k':.^

ji

IIA: ^-DELIVERY

I hereby cert- ,
1988, tru- and correct copies ci L..«
Respona-

*-

's"u *~r •:.,:C:^I:.

* ; rioducti, ^nc., were

delivere.: :•• tnt- L W U ^ ^ L I :
".ary Ferrero, Esq,
Attorney for Appellant
Ronald K. Neilsen, dba
Marina Mechanics Enter: rises
7 060 South Union Park. Avenue
Suite 570
P. 0. Box 7005
SLC\ UT 8 4107
J, Ra^ burr:c:, : .
Attorney for Appellant
Astro Steel Corp,
MUELLER, BARRIOS & CHRISTIANSEN
777 Clark Learning Center
175 South West TCTT.V ! e
SLC, TT^ P4101

